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ABSTRACT
The 2002 film ‘City of God’ tells an anecdotal story of violence in the favelas of Rio de
Janeiro, and is a reminder that the societies we tend to take for granted can actually be a
luxury. The film portrays the daily life of the peripheries of Rio and its relation with
drug trafficking, crime, and poverty, and how it has deteriorated into a war zone so
dangerous that anyone risk being shot to death. Thousands of miles away from the
Brazilian slums there is another so-called city of God, or the city chosen by God to be
the home’s capital of the chosen ones, which is believed by some to be the ‘Land of
Israel’, and nowadays illegally occupies much of Palestinian territories. The occupied
areas of Palestine – Gaza and the West Bank – similarly endure daily violent life with
militarization and targeted killings policies. For the last decades, there has been a state
of permanent conflict in both situations, in which the government wields the law in
order to justify its construction of a narrative of warfare, based primarily in ‘the name of
security’. This paper identifies policies of governance developed by the narratives of
peace and security, and that is heavily applied in both cases, by drawing on the chore
mechanism that sustain sovereignty in modern liberal democracies: its right to occupy
and kill, which can be widely accepted, or at least not condemned, in circumstances of
war. The central argument in this paper is that the existence of a metaphorical war –
against terror or drugs – is necessary in both cases for the State to put forward a plan of
social control and domination, which is carefully constructed within the legal order.
Key-words: Pacification; Settler Colonialism; Necropolitics; Favelas; Palestine.
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RESUMO
O filme Cidade de Deus, de 2002, conta uma narrativa anedótica de violência em uma
favela do Rio de Janeiro, e é um lembrete de que as sociedades que supomos normais
podem ser, em realidade, um luxo. O filme retrata o cotidiano da vida nas periferias do
Rio e a relação com o tráfico de drogas, a pobreza, e como isso se deteriorou em uma
zona de guerra tão perigosa que qualquer um se arrisca em ser atingido e morto.
Milhares de quilômetros distante das favelas brasileiras existe outra então ‘Cidade de
Deus’, ou a cidade escolhida por Deus para ser a capital do lar dos escolhidos por Ele,
que é acreditada por muitos ser a ‘Terra de Israel’, e que atualmente ocupa ilegalmente
muito do território palestino. As áreas ocupadas da Palestina – Gaza e Cisjordânia – de
forma similar suporta o cotidiano violento com militarização e políticas de assassinatos
direcionados. Nas últimas décadas houve a criação de um estado de conflito permanente
em ambas as situações, em que o governo maneja a lei para justificar a construção de
uma narrativa de guerra, baseando-se, principalmente, em ‘nome da segurança pública’.
Este artigo identifica as políticas de governança desenvolvida pelas narrativas de paz e
segurança pública que é profundamente aplicada em ambos os casos e que recorre no
mecanismo central que sustenta o conceito de soberania nas democracias liberais
modernas: o direito de ocupar e matar, que pode ser amplamente aceito, ou, no mínimo,
não rechaçado, em circunstâncias de guerra. O argumento central deste artigo é que a
existência de uma guerra metafórica – contra o terror ou às drogas – é necessária em
ambos os casos para que o Estado impulsione um plano de controle social e dominação,
que é cuidadosamente construído dentro do ordenamento jurídico.
Palavras-chave: Pacificação; Colonialismo de assentamento; Necropolítica; Favelas;
Palestina.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2002 film ‘City of God’, which was based on a book with the same name,
tells an anecdotal story of violence in the favelas (slums) of Rio de Janeiro, and is a
reminder that the societies we tend to take for granted can actually be a luxury, as posed
by the film critic Stephen Holder in a New York Times article right after its release.1
The film portrays the daily life of the peripheries of Rio and its relation with drug
trafficking, crime, and poverty, and how it has deteriorated into a war zone so
dangerous that anyone risk being shot to death. Thousands of miles away from the
Brazilian slums there is another so-called city of God, or the city chosen by God to be
the home’s capital of the chosen ones, which is believed by some to be the ‘Land of
Israel’, and nowadays illegally occupies much of Palestinian territories. The occupied
areas of Palestine similarly endure daily violent life with militarization and targeted
killings policies.
Although the social and political context and the historical background are very
distinct, there are many associations that can be established between both ‘cities of God’
– the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. In the
popular belief of Brazilians, the associations are superficially made, and usually rely on
the number of deaths and the amount of violence. But there are more similarities, such
as the militarization, violent daily life and social injustices, which are important
components of social exclusion through capitalist accumulation in both conflict areas.2
The existence of both locations is, in the first place, a historical product of the mode of
accumulation of settler colonialism.3
In November 2018, the far-right congressman Jair Messias Bolsonaro was
elected the President of Brazil. In his thirty years of public life, Bolsonaro has openly
promoted racist, homophobic and misogynistic discourse in which he has also argued in
favor of torture and dictatorship. While campaigning, he addressed his voters with antihuman rights discourses, such as ‘human rights to the right (i.e. good) humans’. The
violence in his words has been matched by his body language: his main campaign
symbol, which went viral in social media, was to raise his fingers like a gun with which

1

See Stephen Holder. FILM REVIEW; Boys Soldiering in an Army of Crime. Jan. 2003. The New York
Times.
2
Bruno Huberman and Reginaldo Mattar Nasser. "Pacification, Capital Accumulation, and Resistance in
Settler Colonial Cities: The Cases of Jerusalem and Rio de Janeiro." Latin American Perspectives 46, no.
3 (2019): 131-148. At 132.
3
Id. At 133.
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to shoot his political enemies, which he considers the ‘enemies of Brazil’.4 This populist
rhetoric gained the hearts of great part of the voters, who perceives human rights as
being an instrument of protection of the ‘enemies of the state’.
Bolsonaro’s campaign was strongly supported by Brazil’s increasingly
influential Evangelical movement, who are known to support Zionist ideas.5 As a result,
Bolsonaro promised to move the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In response,
Netanyahu was present in Bolsonaro’s inauguration, and was the first person to be
embraced by him. A couple of months later, the two heads of State visited together the
Western Wall in Jerusalem. The embassy was not moved, but the solidarity between the
countries augmented. From this alliance, some authors claim, it is already expected a
deepen relationship on trade and defense between the countries – specifically the war
industry – which can threaten the lives of various communities in Brazil and Palestine, 6
for reasons further discussed.
Similarly, the city of Rio de Janeiro and Israel has exchanged apparatuses of
security since before two major sport events – the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016
Olympic games. Back then, the involvement of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions
(BDS) movement created the ‘Olympic Without Apartheid’ campaign to protest against
the Israeli securitization of the Olympics.7 As posed by some authors, such solidarity
sought to advance transnational resistance against colonialism, capitalism and racism.8
While Brazilian activists shed light to the extend of Israeli security exports to Brazil and
how these connected to the ongoing military violence against Palestinians, especially in
Gaza, academics such as Lisa Hajjar, Shir Hever and Daryl Li documented how Israel
used the military occupation to test new weapons and security techniques, prior to their
sales.9 Additionally, Israeli government introduced its idea of ‘safe city’ at a seminar on
public safety for eight Brazilian states that would host World Cup games. The concept
of Israeli safe city is based on state surveillance of phones and internet in Gaza, and the
safe city product has reached a global market predicted to generate $226 billion from
2015 to 2020.10
4

Vanessa Maria da Castro. Why did Bolsonaro’s supporters vote for him? In the book from Conor Foley,
ed. In Spite of You: Bolsonaro and the New Brazilian Resistance. OR Books, 2019.
5
Id.
6
Chandni Desai, Heather Sykes. An ‘Olympics without Apartheid’: Brazilian-Palestinian solidarity
against Israel securitization. Race & Class, vol. 60(4), 27-45. At 28.
7
Id.
8
Id. At 29.
9
Id.
10
Id. At 31-32.
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In the city of Rio, numerous favelas were subject to evictions, house
demolitions, occupation and siege by Brazilian military and police forces right before
the Olympics. Many of the technologies used to patrol and surveil the favelas, such as
armored vehicles and drones, were made by Israeli security and weapons companies.
Gradually, favela inhabitants, who historically have been living under a perpetual state
of violence, were struggling to resist state violence, police brutality and militarism.
Instead of providing people with education, health care, adequate housing, the Brazilian
government start sending in favelas the military that kills, under the pretext of a highly
legitimized ‘state of exception’– a war on drugs and the drug traffickers who controlled
favela’s territories.
During the major sport events, there were increased police killings in favelas,
with a black majority. Police reported that the deaths were mainly resulted from armed
confrontations, but Brazilian lawyers’ guild and Human Rights Watch documented how
most were executed by close-range shots to the face, neck, or back. During the World
Cup, in 2014, police killed forty-four people throughout the city, and were responsible
for 1,100 extra-judicial deaths per year in Rio.

11

Yet, police brutality and killing of

black people is not the exception, but the norm: in Brazil, executions, commonly
addressed under the concept of ‘resistance killings’ by on-duty police are legally
justified on the basis of ‘resistance followed by death’. This concept was formalized in
1969, during the state of exception of the military dictatorship. Since then, young and
black men continue to make up the majority of ‘resistance killings’ by police.12
Contemporary conflicts are transdimensional in character. As noted by Jairus
Victor Grove, although conflicts are local in character – such as the favelas’ armed
conflicts in Brazil and the occupation of Palestinian territories –, they are usually
connected by interest, solidarity, or curiosity to other distant spaces that in turn
reinforce and resupply these local conflicts in ways that defy settled definitions of civil
wars, proxy wars, or internationalized conflicts.13
The rhetoric of populism generally follows a logic that creates the conditions for
building up the identity of the people as a political subject. Similar to the strategy
utilized by colonial powers, it aims to confront the identity of the people to the people’s
‘other’: the threat to its own existence, its enemy. Often, ethnic and religious groups are

11

Id. At 35.
Id. At 35.
13
Victor Faessel. The Oxford Handbook of Global Studies. Oxford University Press, 2018.
12
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preferential candidates for the enemy position.14 In the case of unwanted and/or
marginalized populations, often considered to be the ‘enemies of the state’, such as the
inhabitants of favelas, and the Palestinians living under occupation, Law is wielded
under the pretext of securitization in order to dispossess, remove, concentrate, and
control the local population. The securitized presence of colonial subjects is a way to
perpetuate repression.15
Governments frequently justify the state intervention by asserting that the daily
militarization is associated with a ‘rationalist transfer of policies aimed at resolving the
governance challenges that operate in such contexts.’16 Yet, the lack of infrastructure
and access to public services in these areas, and, in the case of Palestine, the denial of
self-determination for its people, helps to sustain the idea that the heavy security is
actually a form of social control and oppression. In the Foucauldian analysis, a structure
of surveillance and control is usually justified under a narrative of security. Therefore,
this paper aims to analyze the state narratives fabricated – especially through law and
order – with the purpose to build a normative framework to justify military intervention
in both favelas of Rio de Janeiro and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Also,
it intends to explore the normative discourses – based on settler-colonial policies –
constructed in which Israeli and Brazilian state justifies the instrumentalization of the
sovereign’s right to kill in the so-called ‘war on terror’ and ‘war on drugs’, respectively.

14

Mônica Herz, Paulo Esteves. Metaphors, myths and 'imaginary Venezuela': manufacturing antagonisms
in the 2018 election. In the book from Conor Foley, ed. In Spite of You: Bolsonaro and the New Brazilian
Resistance. OR Books, 2019. At 87.
15
Noura Erakat. Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine. Stanford University Press, 2019.
Loc 606.
16
Victor Faessel. The Oxford Handbook of Global Studies. Supra note 13. At 132.
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II. SETTLER COLONIALISM, PACIFICATION, AND CAPITAL
ACCUMULATION
The imaginaries surrounding settler colonialism are usually linked to the arrival
of the ‘brave European explorers at foreign lands’. The archetype of men such as John
Smith or los conquistadores – who traveled to at least four continents in order to open
trade routes – is still very much present when settler colonialism is discussed. Western
history tries to present settler colonialism as an institution of the past, left behind by
“developed modern democracies”. However, the elements that constitute both
contemporary colonialism and capital accumulation, especially by pacification and
dispossession of populations, tell a different story.
Like any other progress that Western democracies tell us through the (fairy)tales
of industrial revolution – such as the opening of railroads that spread and speeded
development throughout nations – the framework of settler colonialism, once based on
barbarism and violent exploitation (although far from the sight of the metropole), has
also moved forward in order to accompany the developments of such modern
democracies. After all, why completely dump a strategy that seems to work so well in
accumulating wealth?
The colonization and occupation of geographic spaces for the purpose of
extending the scope of productive labor for capital accumulation is still very much
present in capitalist societies. The structure of the economic process of wealth
accumulation was developed over the centuries after the transition from feudalism to
capitalism modes, and it consists in first, dispossessing the natives from their original
means of subsistence; second, exploit their labor force and forcing them into a wage
system, and, finally, the commodification of its resources and everything else used on
their daily life, including security apparatuses.17 The capital permanently disciplines
people into and in their role as productive and efficient workers, and pacification is used
as its means, as will be further discussed.

i. Capital accumulation and colonial wars: the civilizing narrative
The development of most of the Western nations coincides with the period in
which they engaged in movements of internal consolidation and expansion across the

17

George S. Rigakos. Security/Capital: a general theory of pacification. Edinburgh University Press,
2016. At 2.
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seas.18 The overseas expansion aimed at strengthening internal economy of Western
nations through the advance of mercantilism, which was the economic practice where
governments sought to ensure that exports exceeded imports in order to accumulate
wealth with the purpose of augmenting state power at the expense of rival national
powers.19 To further this policy, the colonized nations were only allowed to trade with
the metropole, although the trade was not equal. By the time settler colonialism took
place in the Americas and elsewhere, European nations had already mastered the
practices for capital accumulation, based on its recent domestic experience developing
property rights and the idea of what Marx calls ‘primitive accumulation’. In the 17th
century, European nations were engaging in a commercial war in which the globe was
its battlefield, and, as posed by Marx, colonial methods were developed employing state
power, having as its flagship the law and the brutal force.20
The process of primitive accumulation consisted in separating the workers from
the means of production, since without such separation there could be no capitalist
accumulation.21 This separation was mainly done by forcible expropriation of land from
agricultural peoples, who were driven from their homes, turned into a productive work
force, and then disciplined into the wage system, all based on decrees (Law), known as
Acts of enclosure.22 This practice of separating workers from any means of subsistence
other than the wage, enclosing the ‘wasted land’ (or unproductive land) and claiming its
property, and rooting the workers to a particular space was crucial to the
proletarianization of people.23 These methods, however, depended in part on brutal
force, for instance the colonial system.24 The same practices were broadly used by the
European colonizers in the colonies, and the practices in the latter helped to develop
even further the same practices within the metropole.
Hugo Grotius, the so-called ‘father of international law’, and Emer de Vattel,
were two of many authors that built the foundations of the normative construction for
the appropriation of ‘unproductive land’ without compensation vastly used to justify

18

A. Mbembe. Necropolitics
Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2020, May 13). Mercantilism. Encyclopedia Britannica.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/mercantilism
20
Neocleous, M. (2012). International law as primitive accumulation; or, the secret of systematic
colonization. European Journal of International Law, 23(4), 941-962. At 949.
21
Id. At 948.
22
Id. At 951.
23
Id. At 953.
24
Mark Neocleous. The dream of pacification: Accumulation, class war, and the hunt. Socialist
Studies/Études socialistes. 2003. At 2.
19
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colonization. For them, the appropriation of ‘wasted land’ was justified, since
cultivation was an obligation imposed by nature (or by God) on mankind.25
One of the most outstanding outcomes of the colonial encounter was the massive
accumulation of capital by the settler colonizers by dispossessing and controlling the
native population. David Harvey identified some of the processes which facilitated the
development of accumulation by dispossession throughout history other than primitive
accumulation, such as the monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land;
the slave trade; usury, the national debt, and ‘most devastating of all, the use of credit
systems as radical means of primitive accumulation.’26 Settler colonial practices focus
on the permanent appropriation of the land as much as political and economic
subordination of the indigenous population, monopolization of its resources, and the
control of its markets,27 and depended in part on brute force.28
In the dynamics of the occupation of settler-colonial practices – a form of
colonialism that normalizes the continuous exploiting lands and resources to which
indigenous peoples have a genealogical relationship29 –, the native is subjected to both
management and gradual elimination.30 While colonizing and dispossessing native lands
in the peripheral nations, the imperial powers demarcated themselves as having the
universal culture, while the Other, the native, was the uncivilized.

31

This rhetoric

justifies the exploitation of the colonized whose cultural and moral inferiority is
demonstrated by the inferiority of their material conditions, at the same time that it
legitimates the privileges of the colonizer and the ‘usurpation’ of indigenous land and
goods.32 The great project of colonization was supported by the law, rhetorically, aimed
mainly at the ‘civilizing mission’ towards the native, who was considered different and
inferior, but also capable of becoming the same.33

25

Mark Neocleous, International law as primitive accumulation. Supra note 23. At 957.
Harvey, D. (2007). Neoliberalism as creative destruction, ANNALS. AAPSS, 610, 22-44.
27
D. Lloyd (2012). Settler colonialism and the state of exception: The example of Palestine/Israel. Settler
Colonial Studies, 2(1), 59-80. At 66.
28
M. Neocleous (2011). War on waste: Law, original accumulation and the violence of capital. Science &
Society, 75(4), 506-528.
29
Alicia Cox. “Settler Colonialism”. Oxford Bibliographies in “Literary and Critical Theory”.
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-97801902219110029.xml
30
D. Lloyd (2012). Settler colonialism and the state of exception. Supra note 20. At 66.
31
See Beckett, Jason. Harry Potter and the Gluttonous Machine: Reflections on International Law,
Poverty, and the Secret Success of Failure. Trade Law & Development 13.2 (2021): 317-368.
32
D. Lloyd. Settler colonialism and the state of exception. Supra note 20. At 67.
33
See HP and GM. Jason Beckett. Supra note 32.
26
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The new forms of capital accumulation and consumption perfected by the
colonial adventures were based on permanent unequal exchange relations between the
colonizers and the colonized. The technologies owned by the Western powers, such as
weapons, medicine, and means of locomotion, very much contributed to the shaping of
colonial empires and their hegemony. Moreover, the development of the art of the
warfare with the mass production of weapons increased the firepower of the colonial
state, which implemented the acceptance of death by the colonial subject and
submission to technology, due fear.
Throughout the centuries, the Western powers presented themselves as the hero
capable of taking away all failures and suffering of the colonized nations, utilizing its
authoritative legal order. However, this civilizing mission could never completely
succeed without disturbances or resistance from the native populations. In order to
expand and enrich its own nation – by plundering and removing wealth and resources
from the colonized world – the imperial powers would have to assure the perpetual
nature of the great colonial project34 which could be achieved by creating a strong
imperial narrative and structure. The colonial authorities would, first of all, ensure the
order of the native population, mainly by keeping them ‘pacified’, so they could ensure
the logic of capital accumulation. The end purpose of the colonies was to make subjects
more productive, first, by eliminating economic alternatives and then implementing a
system of police to enforce a wage-labor system,35 keeping the workforce pacified.
Although the term ‘pacification’ is often associated with military crushing of
resistance, a closer examination of its theory and practice reveals a far more
‘productive’ dimension to the idea, in a sense that its practice is less about counterinsurgency tactics than it is about fabrication of order, in which crushing of resistance is
but one part.36 As posed by Mark Neocleous, ‘the key practice of pacification is nothing
less but a feat of enormous social engineering to (re)build a social order. And what is to
be built in this new order is a secure foundation for accumulation.’37 The entrenchment
of the capitalist mode of production and reproduction through pacification in the
colonies was also based on the implementation of the notion of productive and
unproductive labor, similar to the idea of productive and unproductive land. The colony
should be led by productive labor, and the penalty for being unproductive was the use of
34

Id.
George S. Rigakos. Security/Capital. Supra note 17. At 3.
36
Mark Neocleous. Supra note 27. At 7.
37
Id. At 8.
35
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violence and coercion. As explored by Marx, the violence of wealth accumulation lies
in the heart of the process of pacification; the idea of a police project, which should be
understood as ‘military power’ or ‘war power’, has also historically been tied to the idea
of pacification.38 In other words, pacification is intended to conjoint the idea of police,
war, and accumulation in the security of the capitalist order.39
The violence in the heart of pacification had multiple facets. Heavy security and
police/military power ensured that the commodities and the technologies was kept safe
for profiting purposes, since the juridical order would punish thieves and beggars, and
the labor force would be available to exchange its labor power for wages. In the
colonies, social control was slowly being implemented by means of irregular processes
of pacification, that would target specific individuals, while also reinforcing race, class,
and gender divisions among society. 40 One of the mechanisms utilized by the colonizers
to reinforce this societal division and ensure the capital’s conquest through productive
labor in the west was ‘the hunt’.41 The hunt was the persecution of those who wouldn’t
contribute to the capital accumulation/productive labor, or of the victims of its unfair
distribution. In a way, they epitomized the obstacles to the bourgeoisie’s capital
accumulation.
In Europe, the hunt occurred as the criminalization and persecution of
vagabonds, beggars, and paupers. Capitalist accumulation was secured by the manhunt,
that facilitated the creation and maintenance of order among society.42 The assemblage
of institutions through Law by imperial governments cracked down on vagrants,
beggars and the idle, at the same time that militias were created for the same purpose.43
The same practices of the hunt occurring in Europe were transferred to the colonies, in
order to create a labor force able to reproduce the capitalist system of wealth
accumulation. As posed by Neocleous, this ‘manhunt’ was ‘nothing less than a core
police power in the pacification of the proletariat.’44 This system of the manhunt –
shaped in a way to create, validate, and maintain the capital accumulation of the
colonial world – evolved and transformed into what many modern democracies consider
nowadays the ‘security apparatuses’.
38

Id. 9.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. At 9.
42
Id.
43
Id. At 10.
44
Id. At 18.
39
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The modern assemblage of institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections,
calculation and tactics that capacitate the security and securitization of whole of
populations is named by Foucault as ‘governmentality’.45 For him, ‘with the
government it is a question not of imposing law on men, but of disposing of things: that
is, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even using laws themselves as tactics – to
arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such-and-such
ends may be achieved’.46 The core mechanism of governmentality is the regulatory
‘apparatus of security’, which appeared in the eighteen-century Europe, when there was
a governmental shift from power primarily directed over ‘territories’ to power
increasingly focused on ‘population’.
Foucault, when analyzing the history of Western nation-states through a politicotheoretical perspective in Society Must be Defended, addresses the consequences of the
security state epistemic shift in Eighteen Century Europe, which helped the production
of the racial divides. For Foucault, the emergence of ‘biopolitics’ is intimately
connected with the emergence of the state racism discourse that helps to sustain the gap
between the civilized and the uncivilized, particularly relating to the construction of ‘the
enemy of the state’ or ‘the enemy of the nation/society/people’ – the subjects of the
manhunt. The presence of the racial discourse in Western political thought and practices
becomes important in order to reimagine foreign spaces and rule foreign people. It is the
sovereign’s practices of imperialism and exceptionalism (to include through the
exclusion) that helps to sustain the racial narrative of the colonizer.47
The technologies of biopolitics aiming for pacification, became one of the most
powerful strategies of Western imperial dominance since the colonizer’s selfaffirmation and identity construction is configured on the basis of stigmatizing and
downgrading the identity of the Other. The identity of the native is fabricated as being
different from the colonizer, in both spatial terms – alien –, but also in temporal terms –
backwards, barbarous, and pre-modern.48 The biopolitical focus on lives and bodies of
the colonial subjects – and the subdivision of the population into subgroups (racism) is
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repressive per se.49 As Hannah Arendt suggests, the politics of race is ultimately linked
to a politics of death.50 In Foucault’s terms, the technology of racism aims the exercise
of biopower, which regulates the distribution of death and make possible the state’s
murderous functions. It is, above all, the condition for the acceptability of putting to
death.51
As a result, a ‘society of security’ appeared as the ideal model of modern liberal
society ready to defend its universal values, and a project of securitization is utilized by
powerful nation-states, within their borders and beyond. The law and the army (of the
colonizer) represents the nation-states’ most effective repressive apparatus that are used
to enforce the colonizers’ universal values – the latter representing the embodiment of
the lawmaking violence, which is the foundation of the former. They are parts of a
disciplinary and juridical machine, according to Joseph Massad.52 For the philosopher
Walter Benjamin, there is a lawmaking character inherent in military violence, which is
needed in order to maintain the state.53 To put this project of securitization in practice,
the idea of war is gradually inserted in the idea of peace, since the pacification of those
considered the enemies, the barbarous, was essential to the safety of the population.
In the eyes of the colonial conqueror, Western colonies are seen as the territory
of ‘savages’, where savage life is just natural life, as posed by Achille Mbembe. They
are not organized in a state form, their armies do not form a distinct entity, and their
wars are not wars between regular armies. As such, colonial subjects are said to not
establish a distinction between combatants and non-combatants, or between ‘enemy’
and a ‘criminal’. It is impossible to conclude peace with them,54 instead they need to be
pacified. Colonial warfare is, thus, not subject to ‘normal’ legal and institutional rules,
but to an exceptional one. Representing an exceptionalism, it crudely displays the
ultimate expression of sovereignty: the capacity to dictate who may live and who must
die. Here, biopower turns into necropower.55
The origins of the necropolitics of governance is connected to the colonial origin
of the politics of identity and the pacification of its population. As posed by Achille
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Mbembe, colonial occupation consisted in seizing, delimiting, and asserting control
over a geographical area, and of assembling a new set of social and spatial relations on
the ground. This territorialization amounted to the production of zones, enclaves, and
hierarchies; different classification of people; resource extraction; and, finally, the
elaboration of a large reservoir of cultural imaginaries of identities. Mbembe explains
that these imaginaries ‘gave meaning to the establishment of different rights for
different categories of people, rights with different goals but existing within the same
space – in short, the exercise of sovereignty’,56 in which the colonial power would wield
its power of death over those who were targets of the manhunt. The manhunt – the
central strategy of pacification and accumulation – is used as a necropolitical tool to
guarantee the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production and reproduction for
capital accumulation in settler-colonial spaces, considering that the life of those who do
not fit into the capitalist mode of production is seen as less worthy, or even worthless.
It was due to the externalization of violence to the colonies and colonial subjects
through racist narratives, mainly ruled by ‘nonnormative conventions and customs’ (or
‘exceptionalism’), that the colonial conquest paved the way to a sphere of unregulated
war, to war-outside-the-law, as posed by Mbembe. Paradoxically, while democracies
were exteriorizing ‘exceptional’ violence onto the colonies with brutal acts of
oppression, they were also internally developing norms and laws aiming at
‘humanizing’ war.57 These norms would eventually become what the mainstream
perspective considers nowadays the origins of ‘international humanitarian law’.
Although modern liberal democracies attempt to present themselves as recognizing
fundamental rights and formal liberties by turning the laws of war into “Humanitarian
Laws”, the natural life remains included in the form of what is said to be the
exception.58 The right to kill, thus, still remains under the prerogatives of the sovereign.

ii. Bringing exception within Law
According to Carl Schmitt, the ability to suspend the law’s application is a
sovereign exception. For the author, the decision to declare an exception is based on the
sovereign’s own assessment of what is necessary to preserve the State’s survival. The
exceptional, in Schmitt’s sense, is that space in which norms are suspended, and where
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programs of norm-implementation cease to govern decision-making.59 Some authors,
such as Lord Steyn, would say that the state of the exception is a zone beyond the reach
of the rule of law, a space of lawlessness, and therefore not law at all.60
Giorgio Agamben, on the other hand, claims that the exception is a space in
which the sovereign affirms its authoritative locus within the legal order by acting to
suspend the law altogether. The state of exception, according to Agamben, is neither
removed from the legal order, nor creates a special kind of law, but rather defines law’s
threshold. More precisely, in his view, the state of exception is neither external nor
internal to the juridical order, it is rather a zone of indifference, where inside and
outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other.61
Western legal doctrine views an exceptional fact pattern as sui generis (Latin for
‘of its own kind’). In these cases, since there is no precedent or analogy, it is said that
there is the need to establish a ‘new law’, or an exception to the rule. In Agamben’s
sense of exceptionality, declaring a fact as having a sui generis juridical nature produces
a lawmaking authority that empowers the sovereign to produce new law that, in
‘normal’ situations, wouldn’t be enforced.62 The legal regime labeled as sui generis,
however, is nothing but the outcome of a very well-constructed legal work, filled with
expertise, procedure, scrutiny, and analysis, a space where law and legal proceduralism
speak and operate in excess.63
The ability to declare an exception or a sui generis situation in the national and
international system is predicated upon the strength of the sovereign to withstand
censure. This means weaker actors, although able to produce municipal laws in order to
structure its governance, can be subject to a sovereign exception by stronger states, but
are rarely able to declare one against them. Overcoming this condition is not merely a
matter of insistence on applicable legal norms, but requires instead a direct challenge of
the geopolitical structure that maintains the framework of exception.64 This is because
there is a spontaneous consent given by the great masses to policies imposed on social
life by dominant (‘hegemonic’) groups.65 This consent, however, is not as consensual as
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one would presume, since it is usually guaranteed by power and wealth, and a fear of
turning into the enemy of the greater imperial nations.
In order to illustrate this sui generis framework that was widely used by modern
liberal democracies, there are a few landmark cases decided in the US Supreme Court.
In one of the first United States Supreme Court’s decisions on Aboriginal Rights in
1823, Johnson and Graham’s Lesse v. M’Intosh, the Court held that the US could not
interpose Indian law, since it was not enforceable by US legal system.66 Such aboriginal
rights, which are not quite rights recognizable by the colonial powers, have come to be
known as sui generis rights.67 In Australia, similar decisions were being made until the
Mabo decision. The Australian legal system was seen as ‘frozen’, and racial
discrimination was embedded in it.68 In Mabo case, the Australian Court decided that an
aboriginal right has its origin in and acquires its content from the traditional laws
acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the native inhabitants of a given
territory. Yet, this assessment depended upon the recognition of the aboriginal law by
Australian judges, in an Australian courtroom, which implies that Australian law is
somehow superior.69 Therefore, Mabo confirmed that the common law captures
customary law within as an internal-external space of exception, incorporating it
without assimilating it.70
Over the centuries, Western law has created a framework in order to talk across
cultures about the supposed justice and efficacy of wartime violence.71 For a while, the
sui generis framework and the discourse of exceptionality helped sustain the appearance
of legality when colonial powers faced difficulties in finding existing law. Yet, Fleur
Johns observes, when analyzing the normative framework applied in Guantánamo Bay
(considered by some as a ‘space of exception’)72, that there was a shift in the XXI
century, in which modern liberal democracies have been constraining or avoiding
experiences of the exceptional. For the author, the exception has considerable effect in
modern societies, since by assuming ‘the affect of exceptionalism, the normative order’
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soaks up ‘critical energies with considerable effectiveness, for it is the exceptional that
rings liberal alarm bells’. Moreover, in modern democracies, ‘human rights law abhors
a vacuum’.73
Today, efforts are being constantly made by authorities in order to legitimize
tactics of violence as a way to carry out war through law, without resorting to an
exception. The post 9/11 legal doctrine pushes the exception within the legal norms, and
the sovereign does not need to decide upon it any longer, avoiding, thus, individual
criminal responsibility. In modern liberal democracies, harsh security measures are
codified or said to be found within international law. As a result, narratives of war are
usually fabricated, such as ‘war on drugs’, or ‘the war on terror’. By using rhetoric of
war, the exceptionality is justified and found within the legal order. In addition, wartime
is seen as a great event that includes the suspension of civil rights, and harsh measures
against the ‘enemies of state’, that goes from interrogation of enemies to targeted
killings policies.74
However, there are several problems in using traditional war powers in
nonconventional campaigns of violence carried out by so-called ‘enemies of the state’.
In traditional and symmetric wars, the enemy is in uniform and belongs to an
identifiable foreign government. In asymmetric conflicts, there is no uniform, no flag.
The result in using traditional means of war to hybrid and unconventional conflicts is
the enforcement of a set of rules which vastly diminish civil liberties.75 Eyal Weizman
observes that international organizations and human rights groups seek to push it in one
direction (protect civil liberties and human rights), while state militaries seek to push it
in the opposite one (diminish civil liberties and the derogation of human rights).76 As
some conservatives would say, ‘human rights are to be given to the right (i.e. ‘good’)
humans’. In this tug-of-war, the domestic audience that are often bombard with
populistic views, usually perceives the human rights and its defenders as being
indistinguishable from the enemy Other, and not rarely confront them.77
One of the greatest structural paradoxes of the laws of war is the authorization of
some actions and the prohibition of others, allowing the appearance of a not stable line
between both. The issue becomes wider when dealing with asymmetric armed conflicts,
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especially when the state approach is security related, such as Rio’s ‘war on drugs’ and
Israel’s ‘war on terror’. The governmentality in these situations, based on necropolitical
policies, especially the manhunt, seeks to construct a ‘society of security’. That is the
main reason for the strategic instrumentalization of the laws of war. As posed by
Nathaniel Berman, since 1990 the ‘war on terrorism’ has been replete with examples of
the instrumentalization of the legal distinction between war and not-war, between
‘exceptional’ violence and ‘normal’ interactions.78 In the modern democracies’
perspective, it is through security that the old armatures of the law and discipline, bio
and necropower, better function. In this process, the interpretation of the law is pushed
and pulled in different directions, articulated in conflicting ways, by those with different
strategic objectives.79

iii. Modern war, Law, Pacification, and Necropolitical Governance
In a century in which liberal democracies tend to reject the notion of
exceptionality, asymmetric conflicts have reshaped the performance of hostilities and
the institution of war. Today, to engage in hostilities involves a complex mix of local
and global spaces and a greater quantity of actors participating and observing. As
consequence, law has become a medium to influence the conduct of warfare, and the
notion of legality plays a pivotal role in the construction of the narrative of armed
conflicts.80 As posed by David Kennedy, the distinction between war and peace, civilian
and combatant, even terror and crime, have come to be written in legal terms, as Law
has become the main instrument for interpreting and sustaining the modern war.81
Long ago, when symmetric parties used to go to war, there was supposed to be a
sharper distinction between war and peace, in which it was needed a formal declaration
of war and a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants for the killing to
be privileged. International law has granted combatant’s privilege to most participants
of armed conflicts (especially international armed conflicts) even if one side was
engaged in pure aggression and the other is engaged in self-defense. By granting the
combatant’s privilege, law thus facilitates certain kinds of war. According to Berman,
the privilege is central to the process of legally constructing war as an arena of
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permissible violence and of posing the Law of Armed Conflict as lex specialis in
relation to ‘normal’ law, including criminal law and human rights law.82 However, most
of the armed conflicts fought in the last century occurred in the peripheries of the
international system, and rarely between equivalent parties.83 In the recent history of
international law there was a shift from one battlefield to multiple and disaggregated
battlespaces that has led to different narrative (rhetorical) forms of combat.84
The performance of legality became important in modern military theater.
Military actors, whether states or non-state actors are producing performances of
legality in combat in order to influence not only their adversaries but also a global
audience.85 International law articulates the ‘right’ to go to war, as it also defines the
contours of what shall count as legal (just) and illegal (unjust) wars. The resort to the
use of force – jus ad bellum – is highly regulated by international law under the United
Nations Charter. After the battle commences, another set of rules is applied: jus in bello,
otherwise known as Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), or ‘the laws of war’.86
The narrative of war expresses a disruption from the routine of peacetime. Wars
can escalate dramatically and impact the economic and political resources which would
otherwise have been allocated to public welfare projects.87 As the narrative of war is
now justified within the legal structure, the parties involved feel their cause is just and
no one feels responsible for the suffering and deaths of war.88 Moreover, the ‘sovereign’
becomes shielded from eventual individual criminal responsibility for international
crimes and international wrongful acts. The modern warfare engaged by modern
democracies, as a legal institution, needs its narrative securely entangled with the rule of
law.
According to Clausewitz, ‘war is nothing but the continuation of politics by
other means’. Yet, Foucault identified a much earlier pre-Clausewitzian discourse of
‘politics as war by other means’, in which he explains that the first aphorism was coined
considering the shift in European society after the Middle Ages perpetual state of war to
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a sense of civic peace in the Enlightenment.89 Either way, war and politics are entangled
until today. Nowadays, war and its narratives must be justified by political and legal
means, and it is the appearance of grievance and the legality to solve it that usually
justifies it. When imbued with the authoritative power to interpret law, sovereign states
will subsume the facts onto the applicable legal framework in order to put forwards its
state-building project, molded by neoliberal practices. If a certain group is said to be
using methods of war in service of geopolitical ends, it would be reasonable to expect
from the authorities the enforcement of powers associated with wartime.90 Usually,
these powers are invested in a discourse of ‘pacification’.
In the case of the pacification of a population – such as the narratives utilized in
the Palestinian struggle and the ‘pacification program’ of the Rio’s favelas, and
especially after 9/11 – it is applied a similar pattern of concepts used by law
enforcement that are usually applied in counterinsurgency operations in ‘failed’ or
‘failing’ states, which are said to lack the capacity to enforce and/or uphold a monopoly
of violence. The tactics of counterinsurgency are said to be a powerful means to (re-)
establish the capacity for responsible self-governance, or, in another perspective, a
governance that ensures capital accumulation by dispossession. As previously
discussed, similar tactics were used in the pacification of the indigenous communities in
the period of the great colonies of the Western empires, previously addressed as the
‘manhunt’.
It is as if the colonial wars never ended: they just transformed and evolved,
accordingly to the development of the Western mainstream legal discourse – to wars on
drugs and wars on terror. Until this day, the necropolitical tactics of governance of
modern liberal democracies aim a fabrication of a social order of wage labor that
ensures capital accumulation by dispossession. Their most effective weapon for the
‘manhunt’ is the war power embedded in the police power, or the ‘security apparatus’.
With the security discourse, authorities can further their control over ‘unwanted’
populations, by the formation of violent geographies, enclosed spaces, targeted killing
policies, and extrajudicial assassination, all under the logos of peace. The police and the
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military are, thus, a hunting institution, aimed at pacifying the proletariat to ensure the
wealth accumulation of imperial powers.91
II. Occupied Palestinian territories: settler colonialism and the open-air
prison
i.

The origin of settler colonialism in Israel

As explored in the first chapter, colonialism, and more precisely settler
colonialism, characterizes as a set of policies and practices used to acquire foreign land
and resources for capital accumulation, which is enabled by superior military power.92
In the case of Palestine and the modern state of Israel, its history narrates the most
notorious example of the implementation of settler colonialism through law in the XX
century. The Israeli settler-colonial framework allows the identification of the racist and
necropolitical structures in Palestine, especially in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
involved in the violent pacification of Palestinians.93
The policies of governance in Palestine were shaped more than a century ago.
Differently from other European colonial regimes in the region, Palestine could not
reach its independence after the Second World War due to the institution of a legal
framework of exceptionality evoked by British colonial tactics. A sequence of sui
generis situations have always denied self-governance to Palestinian people. This
exceptional legal regime became central to Israel’s governance of the region.
Throughout the decades, British colonial prerogatives were transformed into
international law and justified the legal framework created in order to deny selfgovernance to Palestinian people, and turn Palestine into Israel, as will be explained.94
The Mandate system was a legal regime carved within the League of Nations to
administer non-self-governing territories appropriated from the Germans and the
Ottomans after the First World War. The Mandate for Palestine was established in July
1922 and declared ‘the historical connection of the Jewish national home in Palestine’,
while not mentioning Palestinian national rights or the right of self-determination. The
Palestinian Arabs, which were the great majority of the Mandate’s population, appeared
in the document only as ‘non-Jewish’. Palestine was then offered to have self-governing
institutions with the condition that it accepted the Mandate system, thus formally
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accepting their legally subordinate position to the Jewish community.95 For that reason,
Palestine rejected the offer, remaining under British control.96
By the end of the Second World War, Palestine was considered ‘sufficiently
advanced that their provisional independence was recognized,’97 and it was not possible
for Britain to keep the same harsh measures of the military regime any longer. Keeping
the Palestinians under control required the implementation of martial law in Palestine in
order to deny Palestinians self-governance and civil liberties. As analyzed in the First
Chapter, when considering structures of settler colonialism, the narrative of
exceptionality is usually evoked in order to place colonial subjects ‘outside of the law’,
or, in other words, to include and control through exclusion. However, the legal
framework applied to colonial subjects represents the law in excess, the crudeness of
law, and its relationship with violence. In Palestine, harsh measures within the martial
law were taken with the implementation of the civil government in order to control,
hunt down, and civilize the native population, such as death penalty and life
imprisonment, people were detained without charge or trial, curfews were imposed on
entire villages and towns, and newspapers viewed as agitating against the Mandate were
suspended.98
In 1947, two years after the creation of the United Nations (UN), Britain
relinquished her mandate to the UN, which became the institution responsible for
dealing with the political aspects of the question of Palestine. On 29 November 1947,
the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181, known as the United Nations
Partition Plan for Palestine, which presented the two-state solution and did not consider
the will of the local population.99 However, Israel declared its establishment in May
1948 while denying a Palestinian state under the argument that Arab countries have
rejected the Partition Plan.100
The Jewish refugee crisis was one of the factors responsible for opening the path
for the creation of a Jewish National Home, and the mass annihilation of Jews by the
use of modern machinery of death by the Nazi Regime.101 The location of the territory
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of Palestine was an important one according to the settler-colonial project of the World
Zionist Organization, which was grounded in Zionist ideology aiming to create an
ethnically defined nation for the Jewish in Palestine, as a ‘return’ of the Jewish diaspora
to their homeland. In the concept of the Zionist ideology, the Jewish people were the
original natives of Palestinian lands. As declared by David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s
founding Prime Minister, Israel would be part of the Middle East only in geography, as
it did not intend to be a pluralistic society reflective of the region, and it would only be
viable with an 80 percent Jewish majority.102
The morning after the partition plan was adopted 75,000 Palestinians in the city
of Haifa were subjected to a campaign of terror, instigated by the Irgun and the Hagenah
(Zionist militias).103 The Zionist leadership understood that violence was necessary to
implement the partition plan, so they mobilized to establish a Jewish state by force. The
plan, though framed in defensive terms, instructed Zionist paramilitaries to inflict
‘forceful and severe blows’ even against civilians who provide militants with assistance
and shelter, while targets would include clubs, cafes, and meeting assemblies.104
Zionist militias forcibly removed Palestinians or encouraged them to flee,
deploying a framework of self-defense and military necessity.105 Aiming to achieve a
defensive system, the Israeli military plan authorized the destruction of villages by
setting them on fire, by blowing up, and planting mines in the debris, and, in the event
of resistance, the dissenting armed forces should be wiped out and the population
expelled outside the borders of the state.106 According to the legal scholar Noura Erakat,
the use of violence and the logic of collective punishment against Palestinians, policies
of governance that would continue to be used until this day, underpinned Israeli military
strategy in the founding years of the Israeli state, even in cases where Palestinians posed
no military threat.107
With the establishment of Israel and its acceptance as a member state in the
United Nations, the erasure of Palestinian peoplehood was gradually being domestically
and internationally normalized. Since the Palestinians were considered a threat to Israeli
survival, the violence embedded in the law, first evoked as having a sui generis nature,
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was increasingly blurring and transforming itself into normalcy. In the next couple of
decades, the Israeli approach to Palestinian natives would be security-dominated, as
they would be the main target of a major manhunt in the region, and the refugees were
denied the return to their lands.108 The shift of Palestine into Israel illustrates
international law’s utility in advancing settler-colonial desires by using the same
strategies of past colonial wars,109 as it will be explored in the next sections.

ii. The transformative occupation and the r(u)ole of Law
Beyond Israel’s borders, the challenge of establishing an apparent state of
emergency in order to subjugate Palestinian citizens proved more difficult, considering
Israel’s lack of sovereign jurisdiction in those territories. Considering the rejection of
the Partition Plan by the Palestinians, the international community considered the West
Bank as part of Jordan, while Gaza was under Egyptian jurisdiction.110 As a
consequence of the 1967 war initiated by Israel, with simultaneous attacks against the
Egyptian and Syrian air forces, the territories of Sinai (Egypt) and Golan Heights
(Syria) were occupied by Israel. However, these territories did not pose as many legal
challenges as the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, also occupied by Israel.111
The main concern was regarding the legality of Israel’s occupation and its compliance
or non-compliance with its legal obligations as an occupying power. The arguments of
the discussions were mainly found in international humanitarian law – the laws of
occupation and international human rights law.112
The mainstream legal order used the atrocities of the Second World War as a
historical moment to develop international law regarding armed conflicts. The objective
was to ensure a more ‘humanitarian’ approach to the laws of war. The plenipotentiaries
convened in Geneva, in 1949, and drafted four conventions that were said to be an
attempt to better protect civilians in situations of armed conflict.113 The Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, usually referred to as the
Fourth Geneva Convention, particularly enhanced protections of civilians by classifying
them as protected persons under international humanitarian law. In international law,
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there was a shift of attention ‘from the rights of the ousted sovereign to the rights of the
civilian under occupation’.114 Israel ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1951.
Article 35 of the Israeli Military Proclamation Number 3, issued by Israeli Area
Commanders of the West Bank in July 1967, instructed Israeli military courts in the
West Bank to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention, under which Occupation Law is
subsumed.115 Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention expressly forbids the
individual or mass forcible transfer of protected persons from occupied territory; and the
transfer or deportation of the occupier’s civilian population into the occupied territory.
The norm was created to explicitly prohibit any future occupying power from using
their authority to fulfill political, racial, territorial, or colonial ambitions they might
nurture.116 Besides the Fourth Geneva Conventions, the provisions of The Hague
Regulations of 1907 also address norms regarding occupation law.
In mid-September of 1967 the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol sought to
establish a civilian settlement near Bethlehem, in the West Bank.117 He thus asked
Theodor Meron, then Legal Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whether
occupation law applied to the West Bank. The legal adviser concluded, in a top-secret
memo, that the Fourth Geneva Convention did apply in the OPT and its Article 49
categorically prohibited the establishment of permanent civilian settlements in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip. Additionally, Meron advised in his memo that, if Israel
chooses to build a civilian settlement, it should be built in the framework of camps and
with the appearance of a temporary nature.118
By the end of September 1967, Israel started building civilian settlements in the
West Bank under the coverage of military outposts, to create a veneer of temporality.
Despite their civilian status, the government would publicly refer to the settlers as
soldiers.119 Later on, however, Israel would claim the inapplicability of occupation law
(Fourth Geneva Convention and The Hague Regulations) in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, primarily in order to avoid compliance with the obligations of an occupying
power, such as the rights of the protected persons. Additionally, the norms embedded in
the Fourth Geneva Conventions and The Hague Regulations consider the occupying
power as a trustee, incapable of modifying the territorial and demographic status quo
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ante (before the occupation), which, therefore, would be a hurdle for future Israeli
settler-colonial policies.120
Meanwhile, Israel would avoid absorbing the Palestinian population, as this
would disrupt the demographic Jewish majority achieved after the 1948 War.121
Additionally, by 1967 colonialism and conquest had become delegitimized in the eyes
of the international community. Due to the development of ‘Human Laws’ in the
mainstream legal order, the old colonial tactics for the exploitation of native lands could
not be used any longer, and there were not many legal options left. For Israel to ‘grab
the land without its people’ it had to construct legal and political machinery through
legal work to justify the administration of West Bank and Gaza and its policies of
governance.122 In order to implement its regime of accumulation by dispossession,
including its necropolitical tactics, as discussed in the previous Chapter, Israel would
need to maneuver its legal structure, to create the appearance of legality.
A very common settler-colonial narrative, when the colonizer intends to make
the new environment they land at as their permanent home, is to claim that the
indigenous of the land does not exist, as people or as a community with a separate
identity, and the land is empty. In many cases, in order to ensure the land is in fact
empty, the settler just does not exploit but eliminates the native population123, such as
with the manhunt institution. Israel, when confronted to safeguard international
humanitarian norms, claimed the land was empty when the first Jewish settlers arrived,
in other words, it was terra nullis.124
Law Professor Yehuda Zvi Blum, a lecturer at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, published an article titled ‘The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the
Status of Judea and Samaria’ in 1968.125 The article, an examination of the lawfulness
of a military order under the law of occupation, explored a preliminary question on
whether Jordan had a valid title to Judea and Samaria (West Bank).126 The article
concludes that Jordan had no title, nor did anyone else, and, therefore, the law of
occupation did not apply in the situation of the West Bank. Blum’s ‘missing
120
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reversioner’ theory became the centerpiece of Israel’s official position to deny the
applicability of the law of occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1971, Israel’s
Attorney General, Meir Shamgar, stated that:
[t]he territorial position [of the West Bank and Gaza] is thus sui generis, and the
Israeli government tried therefore to distinguish between theoretical juridical and
political problems on the one hand, and the observance of the humanitarian
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the other hand.127
By this time, Israeli did not consider the Palestinians as a juridical people and
therefore denied their rights to sovereignty and self-governance. The Palestinian people
had very little to say in the debate. The supposed sovereign void in the territories, in
Israel’s understanding and Blum’s theory, nullified the application of occupation law
and freed Israel from the law’s strict regulation. The argument presented was that the
territories were neither occupied nor not occupied, but rather sui generis.128 The
construction of this exceptional situation reflects the outcome of a policy needed in
order to avoid the regulation of the territories through occupation law. It was desirable
for Israel that settler-colonial mechanisms were assembled in order to dispossess,
concentrate, and control the native population.
In the international arena, right after the conquest of territories in the 1967 War,
Israel started to engage in a political chess match with two countries it has seized lands
from – Egypt and Syria – promising it would return the territories in exchange for the
promise of peace.129 In November 1967, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 242, which called on the Arab states to accept Israel’s right to ‘live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force’. For
geopolitical reasons, Arab states acknowledged the resolution, mainly because of its
clause calling for Israel to withdraw from ‘territories occupied in the recent conflict’.130
The Resolution, however, did not address the Palestinians as a people, nor mention their
right to self-determination. Moreover, the omission of the definite article ‘the’ when
referring to ‘territories occupied’ by Israeli raised the question: from which territories
would Israel have to withdraw in order to allow peace?131
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iii. The permanent occupation and the r(u)ole of Law
After launching its settler-colonial state, Israel set off a new colonial endeavor to
expand its boundaries even further. Throughout the 1970s, there was a proliferation of
civilian settlements in the West Bank. Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin
justified the presence of the settlements as temporary and therefore not a seizure of
Palestinian lands.132 Although temporary, Israel’s Chief Supreme Court Justice, Meier
Shamgar, would argue that factual conditions determined the length of the occupation,
which could be indefinite so long as not permanent. In his own words, ‘according to
international law, the exercise of the right of military administration over a territory and
its inhabitants had no time-limit’ and this system of government could ‘continue
indefinitely’.133 This legal work has allowed Israel to continue its civilian settlement,
demonstrating intent not to annex the land and without posing on the territories any duty
to withdraw.134
Long before the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israeli Courts had
already adopted the dualist theory in order to enforce international law in domestic
courts. In this approach, customary international law is part of domestic law and, unless
it contradicts an act of parliament, it applies in domestic courts. In contrast, norms
contained in treaties must be explicitly incorporated into domestic law by an act of
parliament in order to be applied by domestic courts.135 The laws of occupation
prohibiting the establishment of civilian settlements in occupied territories, as being
norms of customary law are thus theoretically enforceable in Israeli Courts.136 However,
the Supreme Court has refused to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention as part of
customary international law and has exempted itself from expressing its opinion
regarding the application of Article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.137
The Israeli Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on settlements was framed, between
1968 and 1979, by three points: it had avoided ruling on the legality of the settlements
while claiming that general petitions against the policy settlement were non-justiciable;
it had rejected arguments based on the prohibition of populations transfer as customary
132
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law; and it had accepted that civilian settlements by Israel’s nationals could serve
military goals.138
In 1972, in the Helou case, the Supreme Court ruled that it was necessary to
evict the Bedouin inhabitants from their place of residence, an area separating the Gaza
Strip from the Egyptian Sinai, claiming a security measure, even though the same land
which they were living was designated for Jewish settlement. This opinion paved the
way for the establishment of settlements under the guise of military or security needs.139
In the Beit El case (1978), private land was requisitioned from Palestinian landowners
on the pretext of military necessity and given to civilian Jewish settlers in accordance
with the military’s strategic regional defense plan. In this case, the Israeli Supreme
Court (ISC) did not recognize the distinction between the needs of the occupying army
and the general security interests. For the Court, ‘[t]he military aspect and the security
aspect are therefore one and the same.’140 After these two decisions, a recurring
argument used by Israel to justify requisition of land in the West Bank was ‘for essential
and urgent military need.’ According to the scholar Noura Erakat, ISC would act
steadily in the creation of the legal fiction of military necessity, while at the same time
blocking any Palestinian effort to challenge the contradictions posed by the
requirements of humanitarian law.141
In 1979, in the Elon Moreh case, civilian militant settlers’ movements had
initiated the establishment of a settlement in Palestinian private land, which was later
supported by the military, for military reasons, although the first and dominant
consideration had been political. When deciding on the matter, the ISC diverged from
the previous decisions by limiting ‘military needs’ to needs based on a military-strategic
analysis of the dangers faced by the state, rather than ideological goals.142 The ISC,
then, rejected the claim that the military requisition of private land for the establishment
of permanent settlements could be lawful.143
Following the Elon Moreh case, the Israeli government justified the land
seizures in the West Bank through a combination of administrative tools, including the
declaration of land as state land, or as absentee property, expropriation for public needs,
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among others.144 The goal was to ‘settle the areas between the concentration of the
minority population (Palestinians) and around them, with the objective of reducing to
the minimum the possibility for the development of another Arab state in these
regions.’145 Later Supreme Court decisions dealt with the procedures to declare
Palestinian land as state land, and other aspects of the settlement policy, such as
‘planning decisions, the building of roads, and the expropriation of land for that
purpose.’146
Israel’s juridical approach highlighted the prolonged character of the occupation
in Palestinian territories. This quasi-permanent character of the occupation draws
attention in two ways: first, whether prolonged occupation softens or eliminates legal
restrictions on the occupying power in making legislative changes in the occupied
territory; and second, whether Israel has exercised its legislative competence over the
OPT such that it has effectively annexed the territory, either de jure or de facto. Either
way, as posed by Professor Virginia Tilley, its regime of occupation is characterized as
settler colonialism.147
The settler-colonial framework – which is indispensable for the necropolitical
tactics of governance in Palestine – was and still is applied through the legal work
produced by the occupier. The construction of all these legal exceptions – military
necessity, public needs, etc – displays the creation of a violent geography in Palestine.
Although ‘the exception’ should confirm the norm, in the OPT it doesn’t: the exception
appears to be the norm, considering the number of settlements being constructed in the
occupied lands. The legal work produced by Israelis over decades seems to be the
foundation of the exception becoming normalcy. In other words, the fabrication of a
forged exception would no longer be needed. For Palestinians, nothing really changed.
Israel was simply following the well-known script posed by liberal democracies by
wielding its law in accordance to put forward its state-building project, which
encompasses the colonizers’ safety, and the realization of its economic, political, and
ideological ambitions at the expense of Palestinian livelihood.

144

Hani Sayed. The Fictions of the “Illegal” Occupation. Supra note 113. At 112.
Virginia Tilley. Beyond occupation. Supra note 136 At 57.
146
Id.
147
Id. At 60.
145

28

iv. The myth of the peace process and the creation of a violent geography
In the 1990s, after the First Intifada, the Palestinian, represented by the PLO148,
shifted its strategy: it would finally agree on the application of UNSC Resolution 242 to
the interim process.149 However, although Palestinians believed that the agreement
would facilitate a gradual but inevitable Israeli withdrawal and grant Palestinians state
sovereignty, it actually did exactly the opposite. To achieve its goals, Israeli negotiators
pursued a strategy that permitted maneuvering around international law and human
rights norms by giving its own interpretation.150
One of the main goals of the PLO-Israel agreement was to perpetuate Palestinian
subservience to Israel and its fragmentation. Edward Said called the agreement ‘an
instrument of Palestinian surrender, a Palestinian Versailles’.151 In practice, Israel
wanted to legalize the existing arrangements it had unilaterally imposed on Palestinians
and their lands since 1967.152 The Oslo agreements sustained the legal and
administrative arrangements that Israel had established over the preceding 24 years,
many of which violated international laws of occupation.153 The outcome was
settlement expansion, including land expropriation in violation of the Hague
Regulations; the destruction of private Palestinian property in violation of Article 53 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention; and the continued transfer of its population,
contravening Article 49(6).154
In September 1995, the document known as Oslo II155 was signed in
Washington. According to Oslo II, Israeli forces would withdraw from territories where
there was Palestinian population. The authorities of the Civil Administration would be
gradually transferred to the institutions of the Palestinian Authority.156 The agreements
also divided the West Bank to be administered in three territorial categories, or
jurisdictional zones: Areas A, B, and C (excluding East Jerusalem). By the term of the
accords, in Area A – which constituted approximately 2 percent of the West Bank and
encompassed six major Palestinian cities – the Palestinian Authority (PA) was entrusted
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with exclusive authority over the internal affairs of the Palestinian population, such as
health, education, policing, and other municipal services. The PA would also be
responsible for security, although Israel retained preeminent authority over its own
citizens and all Jewish settlers.157
Area B, which included many Palestinian villages and towns, represented 26
percent of the West Bank and was the territory in which the PA was vested with the
same functional authorities regarding Palestinians, but Israel retained overriding
responsibility for security and complete jurisdiction over Jewish settlers and other
Israelis. Area C comprised approximately 72 percent of the West Bank and was
composed of Israeli settlements, major roads networks, military installations, and
largely unpopulated areas, in which Israel retained full authority and responsibility.158
The fragmentation of the West Bank territories became even more exposed after
its division into the jurisdictional areas and the exclusion of the Jewish settlements in
Gaza from any Palestinian authority. This fragmentation is described by some authors
as Palestinian Bantustans, a reference to the Apartheid-style territories in which the
white National Party administration of South Africa set aside for black inhabitants, as
part of its policy of apartheid.159 Additionally, the Oslo Accords did not transfer
meaningful authority over the OPT from Israel to the PLO. In effect, the Palestinian
Authority’s competence and jurisdiction extended only to governing the Palestinians
living in the occupied Palestinian territories, not the territory itself.160 The agreements
also enabled the Israeli authorities to control Palestinian movements inside the West
Bank between Areas A, B, and C, facilitating the construction of a network of
checkpoints, roadblocks, and a permit system that would regulate the population’s
movements. This structure was also usually internally closed in response to Palestinian
attacks in Israel, stopping all movement between the Areas.161
This construction of West Bank’s violent geography by Israelis stands as an
apparatus devoted to the assertion of power over Palestinian livelihood, but also with
the possibility of the production of death, since Palestinian life is controlled, exposed,
and threatened. As a consequence of the transformative occupation of the West Bank,
Palestinians experience life in a space governed by necropolitical policies, where certain
157
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laws governing life and liberty (of the colonizer for the colonizers) seems not to apply.
Additionally, as elaborated by Hani Sayed, the state-building strategy of Israeli
authorities regarding Palestine goes beyond the mainstream legal institution debate
whether occupational law is or is not applied in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.162 The
concrete governmental practices in which Palestinians have been daily subjugated
display the brutal tactics of oppression against the native population. The ‘architecture
of enmity’ shapes the social and cultural imaginaries through fear, and Palestinians
bodies exist on the verge of destruction, or disappearance.163 As Noura Erakat names it,
Palestinians are seen as ‘the shrinking civilian’.164 The politics of death becomes even
more flagrant with the development of the surveillance techniques, the reform on the
Palestinian security sector, and the targeting killing policies, as will be addressed in the
following sections.
The surveillance techniques implemented after the PLO-Israel agreement
facilitated the subjugation of Palestinians to Israeli power, rendering them susceptible to
all manner of state intervention, from quotidian monitoring to the military onslaught.
Ultimately, the aim of the security sector reform was to target the Palestinians and
preempt any resistance, thus resuming the process of colonization and dispossession
that had started decades before.165

v.

The Palestinian security sector

The cornerstone of the Oslo state-building project was the Security Sector
Reform (SSR). The Oslo Accords had produced a conflicted version of the security
model of governance in the OPT. The outcome of the agreements did not meet the
aspirations of the PA as a liberation movement, but rather envisioned its function as the
occupation’s enforcer, as it emphasized the pervasive limitations to the Palestinian’s
force jurisdiction.166 Since the legal and institutional arrangements of governmentality
in occupied Palestine are assembled to meet Israeli policy objectives, one of the most
significant strategies of Israel was to take over the security sector on the occupied
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territories, aiming to turn this important body of government into an instrument for the
social control of its population.
The transformation of the security sector in Palestine can be traced by three
different phases: the Oslo Accords phase, with the building of the security forces,
(1993-1999); the second Intifada phase (2000-2006); and, finally, the Fayyadism, or the
second state-building project phase (2007-2013).167
In 1994, the Cairo Agreement (a follow-up treaty to Oslo Accords I) stipulated
the establishment of a ‘strong police force’ to guarantee ‘public order and internal
security within the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority,’ which led to the creation of
various Palestinian-Israeli joint security bodies. The proliferation of security forces was
such that, in 1998, the number of security personnel reached between 30,000 to 40,000.
During this period, Yasser Arafat, who was the President of the Palestinian National
Authority, performed a personalized style of governance, marked by corruption,
nepotism, and lack of transparency, which fraught the ability of the security forces’
reputation and its ability to provide safety to Palestinians.168
This phase was also characterized by a clash between the project of statebuilding with the national liberation movement, once led by Arafat himself. While the
former implied the construction of the ‘institutional underpinnings and capacities for the
interim authority to transform into statehood phase on the 1967 borders by 1999’, the
latter presumed that the PA security forces would be an extension to the PLO’s
Palestinian Liberation Army, and therefore engage in a national liberation endeavor of
historical Palestine based on 1948 borders. The two frameworks, however, were
irreconcilable.169
A new round of violence erupted with the Second Intifada, especially after an
incident where, in Ramallah, the PA police stopped two Israeli soldiers in plain clothes
and dragged them to the main police station, where they were beaten, stabbed, and
killed. This incident deepened the Israeli mistrust of the PA forces, resulting in
reconsiderations of their relationship. Right after the event, Israel launched several
attacks against PA security targets, completely destroying the security premises, which
resulted in the destruction of PA forces’ capabilities. As consequence, a gap was
created, that was soon filled by armed groups, including Hamas. The security vacuum
167
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filled by non-PA security actors imposed new challenges to Palestinian governance, as
the Palestinian people perceived these actors as more reliable and legitimate than the PA
actors.170
Yet, the rising of non-PA actors was considered a threat to Israeli security, since
the power of the Palestinian security sector was taken from the hands of those Israel
could control. As consequence, under international and Israeli pressure, the PA was
forced to start a reform project for its security sector and forces. The PA would have to
undertake ‘visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and
groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.’ As a result, the
PA’s security sector was forced to combat ‘terrorism’, apprehend suspects, outlaw
incitements, collect illegal weapons, provide Israel with a list of Palestinian police
recruits, and even report progress to Israel and the United States. In other words, Israel
and its main ally had the primary role in transforming the Palestinian security sector
into an instrument in their ‘fight against terror’.171
The electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, after the Israeli
disengagement, rearranged all the cards, confused all the actors, and challenged the PA
security doctrine. Because of the international community’s boycott of the Hamas-led
Palestinian government, the PA President declared a state of emergency and reorganized
the security forces’ administrative structure. With the appointment of Salam Fayyad to
the Presidency, PA shifted its polity and style of governance, committed to both a strict
reform agenda based on establishing a monopoly of violence by the PA security forces
and the adoption of a neoliberal post-Washington Consensus economic agenda.172
As a result, several executive orders were enforced, such as curtailing freedom
of expression in public spaces and allowing the crackdown on protests against Israel. As
mentioned by Tahani Mustafa, ‘[t]he security sector has effectively become the
mediator between the population and the regime and has been pivotal in creating a
widespread culture of fear through authoritarian practices and human rights
violations.’173 This was demonstrated in February 2011 during the pro-Egyptian and
pro-Tunisian demonstrations in Ramallah, which were allowed in the first place because
these were not directly challenging the PA or its policies. Although the PA leadership
promised to ensure the safety of the protestors, the security forces violently suppressed
170

Id. At 6.
Id. At 7.
172
Id. At 11.
173
Id.
171

33

the protests and made arbitrary arrests. Yet, the effective monopoly of violence was
never devolved to Palestinians, but rather remained with the occupier.174 Without
security independence, which is one of the bases of nation-states and self-determination
– the right to defend itself against foreign and domestic threats – Palestine continued to
be colonized by Israel, and its citizens continued to be seen as worth-less. The security
sector reform implemented by the Oslo accords triggered the emergence of
authoritarianism in Palestine and the criminalization of resistance, both much needed in
order to forward necropolitical tools of dominance, in which targeted assassinations, the
ultimate strategy of the manhunt institution, were the epitome of Israel’s most recent
state-building project.

vi. The sovereign right to kill: the evolution of the targeted killing
jurisprudence
Modern democracies are in a constant struggle to develop the most repressive
measures to combat the enemy threat. With the changes of modes of war, particularly
the standardization of asymmetric wars, special operations are conducted against the
enemies, although existing risks of retaliation by the international community. The great
challenge nowadays is the elaboration of a legal framework to avoid criticism, that can
allow the conduct of assassination policies in order to maintain the population under
control since anyone can become the next target. In the case of Palestine, the policies of
extrajudicial assassinations epitomize the ultimate necropolitical form of governance
used by Israelis in its pathway to its state-building project.
Current practices of assassination carried out by state agents find precedents in
Israeli history as far back as before the inauguration of the Israeli state. As narrated by
Markus Gunneflo, there was a transition of the killing of political opponents from
clandestine, extrajudicial acts of violence perpetrated by the Zionist militias, into
‘targeted killings’ conducted by a sovereign state in occupied territories. The asymmetry
of the legal relationship between the state of Israel and its Palestinian targets, which is
embedded in the history of the Israeli state as previously shown, is at the heart of the
account of Israeli targeted killings.175
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The violent foundation of the Israeli state, combined with several decisions
based on necropolitical policies against the local population, provided Israel the legal
authority and the factual power to designate Palestinians as the ‘Other’, the ‘enemy of
the state’, and even ‘terrorist’, while its own violent and deadly actions are presumed
lawful, in a sense of ‘counterterrorism’.176 In other words, the creation and development
of an assassination doctrine epitomized the manhunt against Palestinians, and is widely
used by Israel as the main policy to reduce Palestinians to a surplus labor force that
desperately needs to be pacified so the capital accumulation by Israeli settlers can
progress. This narrative of constructing the identity of Palestinians – the native
population – as inherently ‘terrorists’ makes them presumed guilty by virtue of its
refusal to disappear.177 Palestinians are considered dangerous by the Israeli because they
pose a threat to them (the colonizers), a circumstance that goes back to the fact that it
was the colonizer that invaded the native’s lands in the first place. By turning
Palestinians into ‘dangerous’, any (violent) response to the violence they faced in the
first place is awaited, in a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Targeted killing, thus, became a novel strategy in the ‘war on terror’, a new form
of warfare, developed to fight a new form of threat to the colonizers. The ultimate goal
is to provide a legal framework of ‘security’ able to hold within its boundaries all the
racialization and dehumanization needed in order to control and subjugate the
Palestinian population, reflecting global regimes of capital, violence, and governance.178
Yet, considering this new strategy on counterterrorism and its role in the global ‘war on
terror’, an important question arises: how can Israel create a legal framework that
addresses the compatibility of targeted killing practices with liberal democratic values?
In other words, how to engage authorities in extrajudicial assassinations with no
accountability? Two decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) help to answer the
question.
In 2002, the ISC issued a decision on a petition by a member of the Knesset to
stop the targeted killing policy. In a very condensed decision, the Court determined that
the targeted killing policy was ‘non-justiciable’, as the choice of means of warfare could
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not be intervened by the Court. 179 With this decision, the ISC claimed that there wasn’t
a legal framework that could be applied in the situation, since it was the ‘sovereign’s’
discretion to choose which means to use to protect its own existence. The Court, thus,
acknowledged that there was enough room for the Israeli Defense Forces and the Israeli
government to use means of warfare against the ‘enemies of the state’, as explored in
the First Chapter, without judicial scrutiny. Therefore, targeted killings would occur in
the frame of exceptionality, usually under the justification of a ‘security threat’.
Yet, four years later, the ISC reversed its decision by issuing a second judgment
regarding the targeted killing policy. In the decision, published in 2006, the same state
policy – targeted killing – was ruled justiciable, and the Court was able not only to
exercise its jurisdiction, but also decide on the applicable law and the interpretation of
that law.180 There was no apparent reason for the eventual realization that a situation
which four years earlier could not be adjudicated by the ISC was now spotted inside the
Israeli legal order. Yet, the decision was taken by the ISC based on international law,
more specifically, international humanitarian law. This landmark decision demonstrates
that Israel spotted the exceptional within the norm, in order to legally justify its violent
policies of death against Palestinians and try to avoid being accused of having an
oppressive regime. The new interpretation given by the Court underscores an
environment of impunity for state violence, considering that the shoot-to-kill policy
appears as an excessive use of force, and Israel is trying to regulate it under the laws of
military occupation as well as the laws of armed conflict.181
The 2006 judgment recognized a ‘continuous situation of armed conflict’
between the state of Israel and ‘various terrorist organizations’ since the first Intifada. In
order to define the ongoing conflict, the decision considered an armed struggle between
an occupying state and ‘terrorists’ who come from the territory under belligerent
occupation as amounting to an international armed conflict. Also, by referring to
International Court of Justice (ICJ) case law, the Court acknowledged that in addition to
the international humanitarian law, international human rights law was also applicable
in international armed conflicts, although that relationship between the two is one in
which international humanitarian law applies as lex specialis.182 In other words,
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international human rights law is applicable when there is room left by the norms of
IHL.
After establishing the legal framework to the rules governing the case, the Court
turned to the question of the categorization of the individuals being targeted under the
targeted killing policy. The ISC decided that it would apply the customary international
law dealing with the status of civilians who constitute unlawful combatants, a term that,
according to Gunneflo, was invented for the purposes of this particular judgment. Such
category of civilians may, in accordance with the ISC decision, be attacked for such
time as they take direct participation in hostilities, thus constituting an exception to the
principle of distinction. This exception is not limited to the issues of ‘hostilities’
towards the occupying army, but also applied to hostilities against the civilian
population of the state.183
As a result of the argument constructed by the Court, civilians who constitute
unlawful combatants may be lawfully killed through executive decision (sovereign
power) without prior judicial oversight. The decision also gives room regarding the
lawful killing of others than those targeted as ‘collateral damage’. The outcome of this
Israeli violent policy is the ultimate example of international law being wielded as a
weapon of war, with which the Israeli government can proceed with its policy of
targeting civilians within the bounds of the law.184 After all, there is a lack of
accountability, not only because of the failure to investigate such incidents, the denial of
autopsies on Palestinian bodies, and the refusal to release bodies for burial; but also the
legal permeability of the killing of Palestinians per se, as a matter of law and policy.185
Because Israel possesses political hegemony in the international arena, its
interpretation of international legal institutions is authoritative within its domestic
jurisprudence. This arrangement of tactics of necropolitical governance throughout the
decades by Israeli authorities turned the Palestinian body turn into something that can
be killed, without judicial scrutiny. As posed in the previous Chapter, the technologies
of power concerning violent spaces are considered the exception by the mainstream
legal institutions, such as the occupied territories of Palestine, although it can be
justified by legal means. In reality, they are nothing more than the normal, mirroring
what is considered the norm when it concerns the necropolitical manhunting institution.
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III. Rio’s Favelas: from performative violence to ‘pacification’
‘Every police car has a bit of slave ship in it.’
O Rappa – (Brazilian band)
i.

The formation of the favelas and its process of colonization

Officially called “subnormal agglomerations” by the Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics186, favela is a pejorative term for slums, squatter settlements,
poor outskirts, and irregular settlements.187 It is difficult to say how many favelas exist
today in Rio de Janeiro, but some authors considered it to be more than a thousand.188
The first favelas in Rio were formed in the XIX century, when Rio de Janeiro was still
Brazil’s capital, and was inhabited mainly by descendants of freed slaves and poor
northeastern migrants.189 Due to the rapid urban growth of the region in the twentieth
century, the favelas were formed as a gathering of irregular houses, such as shacks, and
were established mainly in hills, among and even within wealthy areas of the city.
Until the 1980s, the favelas were mainly represented as locations of poverty,
although counterbalanced by their valorization as the land of samba and popular culture.
The messy and precarious urbanization process of Rio de Janeiro transformed favelas in
communities that contrasted with the urban lifestyle of the carioca190, as these locations
were also perceived as exotic places where the black population brought their beliefs,
their music, and their extravagances.191 The formation of several favelas in the outskirts
of Rio de Janeiro originated the term favelada (and its masculine form, favelado)192,
which eventually became an extreme figure of ‘otherness’.193 The opposition ‘favela
versus the city’ (or ‘the hill’ versus ‘the asphalt’194) until today is related to the
manifestation of the colonial opposition civilized/savage, rich/poor, clean/dirty,
moral/amoral. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, even the medical
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discourse gradually joined the urban discourse, and the favelas started to be addressed
as a ‘social pathology’ that put the city’s beauty and health at risk.195
The definition of favela goes beyond their ‘illegality’, since most of them have
de facto tenure; it also cannot be defined by their lack of infrastructure, since almost all
have access to water, sewage, and electricity; nor can they be defined by the precarious
construction materials, as most of the houses are now made of brick and mortar.196 A
remaining distinction between favelas and the rest of the city of Rio is the deeply-rooted
stigma that still adheres to them.197
The stigma of the favelas has its origins in the history of settler colonialism in
Brazil, since the project of elimination of the native population and the slave trade (and
its abolition without compensation) of African people. Settler colonialism in Brazil was
initially marked by ‘pacification’ of the indigenous populations which included
expropriation, elimination, confinement, and assimilation of entire communities in an
effort to ‘civilize’ them, aiming to produce individuals capable of working for the
capital accumulation of the settlers.198 The idea of a ‘pacified’ group was that of a group
that had been militarily defeated and, as consequence, had set aside its customs by the
imposition of the colonizer.199
Brazil was the last country in the West to abolish slavery, in 1888, and by that
time, an estimated four million slaves had been brought from Africa to Brazil, which
represents 40% of the total number of slaves brought to the Americas.200 In the time of
slavery, African slaves used to work in the house of the aristocracy, but to live in
separate buildings, called senzala. The spatial separation between the slave/black and
the colonizer/white remained long after the slavery abolition. As consequence, the
segregation system existing between aristocracy and the black people perpetuated and
played a pivotal role in the formation of the identity of the favelada, the black woman
resident of a favela (and its masculine form: favelado).
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The legacies of colonialism and slavery in Brazil include the epistemological
production of the black body as the ‘internal enemy that must be fought against’,
especially due to the class-based racism that, translating the social conflicts of the
industrial world in racial terms, ends up comparing the working class and the black
body to the ‘savages’ of the colonial world.201 A great part of the favela population
represents what Karl Marx called the ‘industrial reserve army of labor’,202 and, as such,
represents the superfluity of the city labor force. Over generations, due to the black
subjectification as ‘the enemy’, patterns of police brutality demonstrate that the primary
objective in the police’s engagement with poor, black and favela residents is to kill first
and ask questions later.203 As a result, the black body was subjected to the power of the
transnational liberal policies of necropolitics, as analyzed in the First Chapter. Black
Brazilian workers were, thus, not only confined to informal, segregated, walled-off
housing in periphery regions, but also targeted and often killed with impunity.

ii. From spaces of exception to spaces of capitalist production and
reproduction
Throughout the XX century, several urbanization projects have contributed to
the development of many of the favelas’ infrastructure. Although these communities are
perceived as territories excluded by the official authority, the existence of numerous
laws and decrees since the beginning of the XX century addressing directly the favelas
challenges this perception. Rio’s first zoning law authorized the construction of favela
shacks in the city, provided they were outside the most valued hills.204 The objective
was to transform favelas into invisible cities, by allowing the settlement of the poor in
the outskirts, while proscribing it in central and bourgeois areas.
However, the state’s investment in public services has always been very limited
and inadequate to meet the needs of the growing population.205 The services provided
by the state were only sufficient to maintain a symbolic sovereignty over these
territories. As noted by Rafael Gonçalves, the governmental orientation regarding the
favelas was to ‘tolerate without integrate’: while some public services and investments
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would be realized, the state would also avoid stabilizing the favela as a legitimate urban
space.206 As a result, favela residents would not have their social rights recognized by
the authorities, reinforcing the illegality and informality in such communities.
Gradually, the favelas acquired a sui generis juridical and political status. The
appearance of a juridical emptiness constituted a symbolic border which placed such
communities as being at the same time urban and marginal territories in the city.207
The shift in society’s perception of the favelas occurred during and after the
democratization process in Brazil (1980’s), which corresponded to the increase in
narcotrafficking, formation of organized groups, and augmentation of urban violence in
the city.208 With the new political scenario, the State monopoly over violence ceased:
there was a shift in actors and motives – from predominantly political to predominantly
criminal –,209 which was not, however, a historical coincidence. At the end of the
1970’s, more than a decade since the establishment of the dictatorship, in a prison called
Cândido Mendes at Ilha Grande (‘Great Island’), state of Rio de Janeiro, members of
armed political groups opposing the dictatorship and common prisoners were housed in
the same unit of the prison. Because of the military dictatorship’s strategy of repressing
prisoners, sometimes assuming their relations with the opposition, and submitting them
to harsh treatment, common prisoners absorbed tactical and ideological lessons of how
to behave and survive within prisons from the political prisoners, who were much more
collectively organized.210
Due to its ideological origins, the group named itself as Comando Vermelho
(‘Red Command’), known as CV, and eventually became Rio’s strongest and most
violent non-state organization, controlling the drug trade of seventy percent of Rio’s
favelas by the end of 1985.211 Although the group was originally created to deal with
situations inside prisons, their ideas and rules were quickly spread among Rio favelas,
causing a profound effect upon the social relations established within the communities.
The group began to develop deeper roots in the favelas not only because many prisoners
were from these neighborhoods, but also due to the fact that its successful organizing in
prison was advantageous for criminals to join the organization so they would have allies
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in prison if they were arrested.212 Because CV members were locals and often had better
knowledge of local needs, their ruling started to be perceived as a sharp improvement
from the actions of the police. Police terror was more feared than the barbarity of drug
traffickers since the official authorities would abuse the discretionary power by utilizing
morbid creativity, while traffickers would constrain themselves to CV’s principles and
rules while subordinating their despotic practice to an intelligible and public order.213
From 1990 onwards, with the rise of narcotrafficking and other criminal
organizations, the state’s approach to the favelas was securitized.214 Although illegal
drug markets were being regulated by networks that contained state agents and
economic elites who used money and influence as well as violence in managing their
relationships,215 progressively, the inhabitants of favelas as a whole were identified as
extreme figures of otherness, where anyone could be acknowledged as a potential
criminal.216
As explored in the first chapter, settler colonialism is not a process that history
leaves behind. Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation demonstrates that
dispossession is a continuous process. The violent neoliberal mode of accumulation
called by David Harvey as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ seeks to balance the crisis
of overaccumulation due to the surplus of capital and labor force.217 This process is
frequently sustained by racism, which legitimized a ‘civilizing project’ that aims to
make the colonized lands productive. Yet, the dispossession of poor and marginalized
people living in the favelas is an important component of Rio’s capitalist accumulation
process. The favelas in Rio de Janeiro still permit the accumulation of capital and
considerable investment. De Sousa Santos describes countless outsiders who invest in
the most stable and developed favelas and take out considerable profits from it.218 A
recent study made by ‘Data Favela’ and ‘Locomotiva’ institutes found that favelas
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residents in the entire country move approximately U$ 25 billion a year, which
represents more than each of 20 of the 27 total states of the Brazilian federation.219
In 2010, one-fifth of Rio’s population was a favela resident. Settler colonial
studies have pointed out that the preferential accumulation of space, without necessarily
exploiting the labor of dispossessed populations, has been central to settler colonialism
for centuries. The settler colonizer accumulates the lands and wealth of the population.
As such, the population must be controlled by neoliberal policing strategies, which in
these situations are revealed as a crude form of necropolitics. Yet, the biggest challenge
for Rio’s government in controlling the ‘superfluous’ amount of poor and marginalized
people since the 1980’s is the development of an illicit authority implemented by
criminal organizations.

iii. The parallel-state and the performative violence in Rio’s favelas
In the past forty years, the high unemployment rate among young men and the
absence of strong public institutions, combined with the proximity to wealthy
neighborhoods, turned favelas ideal places for drug sales operations commanded by
criminal organizations.220 Violence erupted as rival groups competed for control over
the territories. As articulated by Professor Anjuli Fahlberg, brutal violence gradually
became the core mechanism for the incipient governance in favelas, a fact that leads
scholars to refer to these neighborhoods as ‘narco-states’ and to their governance
structures as ‘micro-level armed regimes’.221 According to the author, in the 1980s, drug
lords would kill community leaders who attempt to speak out against the drug trade and
replace them with their allies.
Similar to domestic roles of the modern state, gangs would employ coercive
means through violence to construct social control.222 The existence of drug gangs
ruling territories in Rio challenged the official and institutional governance of the
State.223 As a consequence of the State’s absence and its unwillingness (and even
inability) to directly enforce the official law in such communities, there was the
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institution of alternative sources of governance by gangs and drug traffickers.224
Traffickers would enforce the ‘law of the favela’ (also known as ‘law of the hillside’) in
order to protect the residents from petty crime and interpersonal violence,225 which
eventually formed internally safe communities.226 From time to time, the internal peace
would break, typically when a local dono (drug boss) was killed or imprisoned and his
subordinates struggled to succeed him.227
Drug traffickers would make investments in community facilities for the
residents, while in exchange these would have to remain quiet about their illegal
activities, in a sort of ‘forced reciprocity’.228 The use of violence and the profit from
illegal activities would generate pressures on the gangs to assist the community, even if
in limited ways.229
By taking advantage of the historically embedded patronage politics to maintain
territorial control, drug traffickers would engage in ‘clientelism’. They would allow
certain politicians access to the communities for campaigning and vote-gathering, and
command local residents to vote for specific political candidates in exchange for their
support once elected.230 This social scheme provided a link to political organizations, as
well as basic infrastructure to the communities.231 While politicians would control state
interventions, the traffickers dominated over spaces and co-opted communal leaders. As
consequence, both politicians and traffickers would show no interest in changing the
situation or in transforming the nature of social relations in a significant way. 232
In order to keep the drug trade and control over the territories, drug
organizations would enter into corrupt relations with the police, often at a price of
weekly or monthly payments from traffickers to police.233 In some cases, usually when
traffickers and police had trouble in the negotiations, militias would take control over
entire communities after taking down the ruling organization. Eventually, some military
police officers realized they could make more money by controlling territories than
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receiving bribes from the drug traffickers.234 Off-duty police organizations would also
benefit by providing services to residents of the communities they have taken, such as
cable television, cooking gas, and private security to shop owners.235
According to Human Rights Watch, much of the deadly police violence in Brazil
is believed to be committed by off-duty police officers acting in so-called extermination
groups, which target suspected criminals for execution.236 The objective of these groups
would be ‘to clean the area’ and ‘maintain peace’.237 The sense of vigilantism confirms
that off-duty and on-duty police violence uses similar procedures and seeks similar
results.
One could think that invisible cities such as the favelas are off-Panopticon,
especially when they have their own enforced rules. However, the complexity of the
surveillance regime surrounding the favela is better described as a ‘double panopticism’.
While agents of the state monitor the residents from the outside, drug traffickers
monitor them inside. The modern state and its policies of governance are situated in the
daily lives of the inhabitants of the favelas through the narrative of securitization,
considering its ability to employ tactics rather than laws, and even using laws
themselves as tactics to meet its desirable ends.238
Throughout the years, national and local media helped to create and sustain the
idea that residents of favelas are responsible for their perpetual state of brutality and
violence, such as the colonized were told as responsible for their misfortune. Also, they
were blamed for the overall criminality of the city and turned into the scapegoat for the
high rates of murder and violent crimes that were gradually occurring in the wealthy
areas. This discourse of insecurity can be understood through the lens of what Stanley
Cohen delineates as a society’s scapegoat or ‘folk evil’, which is an identifiable object
onto which social fears and anxieties are projected.239 They are, thus, subjects of the
manhunting institution: the police.
As consequence, since the ‘enemy must be fought’, some sense of control over
the favelas gradually became desirable to the elites and the middle class. Such as the
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‘terrorist’ must be fought in the war on terror in a spectacular manner in order to meet
the orderly desires of the global audience and its middle class, the favelado also must be
fought in the war on drugs to meet the orderly desires of the Brazilian middle class,
which mirrors the desires of the financial international community.
The shift in the Brazilian economy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, due to a set
of measures taken to stabilize it, changed the relations between social classes. As a
result, real estate speculation started aiming at poor neighborhoods in wealthy areas,
even though some of them were favelas criminally controlled, such as favela Santa
Marta, in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro240. It was time for the state to drop the sui
generis character of some of the favelas in order to regain territorial control and
integrate these areas into the neoliberal mode of production and reproduction.
From the late 1990s onwards, the rhetoric of ‘war on drugs’, imported from the
US and extended by the national media, contributed to the public support for the violent
operations undertaken by state military police and the special forces of Rio de Janeiro in
order to ‘regain territorial control’. Although there is no guarantee that the fight against
retail drug trafficking represents an effective demobilization of the drug trade, Rio’s
authorities felt the need to elaborate new spectacular forms of policing the favelas,
which would be designed for televised consumption by the middle class.241 While
authorities would base their choice of which favela to launch the occupation on the
amount of violence within it, studies demonstrate that the chosen communities were the
ones that would have the most profitable outcome when integrated in the society and
economically exploited.242
The metaphor of ‘war’ facilitated the launch of a security-related program by the
state of Rio, mainly to address a response to the performative violence of drug gangs.
These military operations would also be performative, and the state, supported by the
national media, would give rise to an aggressive campaign against ‘the enemy
within’.243 However, and not surprisingly, the war ended up turned against favela
residents, who would also be seen as enemies, since they were family, companions,
parents, and neighbors of traffickers, and as so, ‘conniving in their way of life’, having
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chosen the ‘law of the hillside’ instead of the official law, as if they had a choice.244 The
allegory of the criminally controlled favela which was embedded in the collective
consciousness of Brazilians demanded for one side to be picked: the favela or the
asphalt.
Over the years, intellectuals and human rights organizations denounced the
arbitrary and systemic coercion of armed interventions inside the favelas. Because of
the recurrent civil and human rights violations, these territories became qualified as
‘spaces of exception’.245 Spaces of exception are territories in which the state of
exception is permanent, such as zones d’attente in international airports, where asylum
seekers and refugees are held, and even certain outskirts of the city.246 Favela residents
were, since the genesis of these communities and mainly as result of the state’s
omission, banished from the city, targets of social hygiene politics, and excluded from
society while at the same time included in its regime of exceptionality, subject to being
pacified and controlled. Here, the security apparatus – in this case, the military police –
becomes important to the reassurance of power in a deeply destabilized economic
environment, such as Rio de Janeiro.

iv. The exception as practice in Rio’s favelas
The Brazilian flag displays the motto Ordem e Progresso (Order and Progress)
and was inspired by a quote from the positivist Auguste Comte, which says ‘love as
principle, order as basis, and progress as goal’.247 The notion about the possibility of
progress after the implementation of order is part of the Brazilian collective
consciousness. When the middle classes and the elite of Rio began to agitate for a sense
of order in the poor communities surrounding them, the main objective was to integrate
these territories into society so they could be economically exploited, and, therefore,
they could ‘progress’. Thus, to counterbalance the spectacular violence of drug gangs,
the public security practices utilized by the state of Rio de Janeiro, were based on the
strategies of “zero tolerance policies” of North American origin. Yet, when addressing
‘order’, one must bear in mind cultural relativism: the Brazilian notion of order differs
radically from the North American one.
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Military institutions occupied a prominent position in the national scenario
throughout Brazilian history: from the proclamation of the Republic, when a group of
military officers led by Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca staged a coup d’état without using
violence, deposing Emperor Pedro II to the 20-year military dictatorship, which left the
current structures of the military police, responsible for all of the ostensive policing and
the maintenance of public order, as one of its main legacies.248 The sense of order for
the majority of Brazilians is, therefore, connected to the notion of militarized order.
Besides the military police, the federal armed forces are also entitled to uphold
public order. Article 142 of the 1988 Constitution reads:
The Armed Forces, made up of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, are permanent and
regular national institutions, organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline, under
the supreme authority of the President of the Republic, and intended to defend the
Nation, guarantee the constitutional branches of government and, on the initiative of
any of these branches, law and order.

§1 of the same document states that a complementary law would establish the
general rules to be adopted in the organization, preparation, and employment of the
armed forces in local and national operations, which was later accomplished by the
Complementary Law n. 117, of 02 September 2004, which stipulates in Chapter V the
use of federal troops in ‘Law and Order Guarantee Operations’ (LOG operations).249
These norms are the constitutional and legal foundation, respectively, of the LOG
operations, which mandate the summoning of the federal armed forces to act in
functions described as subsidiaries. As a result, the Brazilian Federal Government,
through its President and Minister of Defense, is authorized to deploy military personnel
from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to support state governments facing
problems in public safety.250
The rhetoric of ‘war’ against favela citizens and the brutality of the criminal
organizations lead to widespread public support for LOG operations. The participation
of the federal armed forces was indispensable in a war against the ‘enemy’ of the
asphalt. The narrative of ‘war on drugs’, ‘war against narco-traffic’ was widely used to
create new spectacular forms of policing the favelas, now with the federal army’s help,
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in order to regain territorial control over communities taken by criminal organizations.
In this context, the State displays its sovereignty by assuming control of the political
entity’s decisive power: it is responsible for the distinction ‘friend/enemy’, for the
declaration of ‘war on drugs’, and for the decisions upon the supposed exception.251 The
marginalization of favela communities legitimizes the necropolitical policies used
against its inhabitants, creating spaces of violent geography that are seen as
‘exceptional’ by the mainstream legal order, which in reality displays the ideological
project aimed by state authorities. A project of dehumanization and racism.
As mentioned in the First Chapter, harsh security measures require a constant
reference to the state of exception. Thus, with the escalation of violent military
incursions – now with the involvement of the federal armed forces – determined by the
state of Rio de Janeiro, the favela becomes, once more, a place where the exception is
normalized.252 As detailed by Matthew A. Richmond, after the military police and the
army adopted violent operations in order to occupy the favelas, the residents started to
perceive their rights as citizens suspended during such operations.253 Police authorities
would abuse their discretionary power, and the use of stop-and-search and random
house raids became part of the daily life of the favela resident.
Additionally, prosecutions resulting from deaths at the hand of the police
became extremely rare.254 The necropolitics of the governmentality being implemented
in the favelas inaugurated the possibility of official forces to kill without consequence;
without the characterization of assassination and murder – to kill without the possibility
of a sacrifice, as posed by Agamben when defining homo sacer.255 By waging ‘wars’,
Rio’s Government was aware they could adopt exceptional measures that would
otherwise be unacceptable. The possibility of ‘death penalty’ (re)appears,256 targeted
killings are relativized, and collateral damages are accepted by the public audience.
During military incursions, residents are being constantly exposed to an unconditional
power of death. Even those not involved in conflicts are seen as the ‘enemies’ of the
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state and can be shot dead with impunity by State agents; all in the name of a
metaphorical war deployed to justify such brutality. The ability to generate war through
legal work, therefore, plays a pivotal role in the favela’s state of affairs.
v. Extrajudicial assassinations and the death penalty in Rio’s favelas
Professor Zaffaroni explains that the punitive power of the State is constituted
by two types of criminalization: the primary, which is the establishment of criminal
conducts, and the secondary, which is responsible for the selection of those who will, in
practice, be punished. The author highlights that impunity is the norm, and only a few
agents will be selected by the authorities to be punished. As consequence, most crimes
committed do not come to the attention of the state authorities.257 Moreover, there is a
stereotype of people that are more vulnerable to the selection of the penal system in Rio:
the black population, particularly from the favelas.
In Brazil, the Judiciary frequently acts as a racist structure. As an example, in a
recent shocking judicial sentence made by a criminal judge in Curitiba, in August 2020,
the accused was considered a ‘member of a criminal group, due to his race’, and
portrayed as acting causing population’s unrest and hopelessness.258 In another shocking
judicial sentence made by a judge from Campinas, Sao Paulo, in 2019, it was
highlighted the fact that the victim could not easily mistake the accused by another
person, since he did ‘not have the criminal stereotype, having lighter skin, eyes and hair,
thus not being able to be easily mistaken’.259 In this decision, the judge clearly
recognizes the existence of a ‘criminal stereotype’: the black body. As a result, in such a
state of punitivism, the final judgment is usually anticipated when the accused is black.
When incurring in violent operations within favelas, the military police tend to
perceive the whole population as criminal, and anyone can become the target of
excessive use of force. Additionally, it was the state authority that fabricated the
conditions for the production of a violent geography in the favelas that would allow the
police incursions, in the first place. Hence, the criminalization and dehumanization of
black bodies are used to provide solutions to this violence. The extrajudicial
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assassinations are an important fragment of the anti-black genocidal practices of the
Brazilian neoliberal penal state since the middle class objectifies its fear and anxiety
onto the black body. The outcome is the elaboration of a set of necropolitical tactics of
terror carried out by the military police that contains, kills, and lets black be killed in the
favela.260
The UN Special Rapporteur on extra judicial executions noted that in 2007 Rio’s
‘on-duty police [were] responsible for nearly 18% of the total killings, and kill[ed] three
people every day’, adding that ‘[e]xtrajudicial executions are committed by police who
murder rather than arrest criminal suspects’.261 He stated that the killing of ‘criminals’ is
tolerated and even publicly encouraged by high level Government officials, and the
former Secretary for Public Security José Mariano Beltrame commented that, ‘while
police did their best to avoid casualties, one could not ‘make an omelet without
breaking some eggs’’.262
Due to internal legal barriers, it is difficult to investigate and punish extrajudicial
assassinations. One of the main legal strategies utilized in order to prevent the
investigation of the killings perpetrated by on-duty police officers is the ‘procedure
regarding resistance killings’, that is, killings committed in presumed self-defense.
Although in the favelas many drug traffickers directly confront state authorities, the
classification of self-defense many times conceal illegalities done by police officers,
especially considering the index of police lethality and the selectivity of the social class
being permanently targeted.263 The large amount of cases being closed in the
investigative procedure and even by judges, when they reached Courts, gave rise to a
sense of police impunity among the residents of the communities in conflict.
The Brazilian criminal procedural system privileges police testimony to the
detriment of all other evidence. Also, the procedural delay in the Brazilian judicial
system limits the rights of countless victims of this institutional violence. It seems that
the same institution that works so efficiently in order to punish and imprison the black
body, is completely inefficient to punish state officers that abuse its discretionary
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powers and excessive use of force. As consequence, the possibility of having their
family, partners, daughters and sons killed by state authorities without being able to
address justice turned life in the favelas apparently precarious, or even worthless.
Favelas’ black and poor bodies were also worthless from an economic
perspective. Marcelo Neri, an economist who was chief minister of the Secretariat for
Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic in 2014, wrote that the ‘favelado was
a person poor of resources’, and because of that they were like ‘dead people, with no
market value’. For him, when talking about Rio’s favelas, ‘there [was] a loss of
productive capital in one of the noblest points of the city’.264 Since the 2000s, Rio’s
mayors were trying to find new strategies to regain control over territories near rich
areas and reorder social structures in the city, which have lost prestige since the moving
of the national capital from Rio to Brasilia, in the 1960s. Aiming to regain the lost
prestige, Rio de Janeiro applied to host the 2004 Olympic Games and was defeated but
ended up hosting the Pan American Games in 2007. In October 2007, Rio was chosen to
host the FIFA World Cup and in June 2009, Rio was chosen to host the Olympic
Games, in 2016.
On the eve of the major sports events, the state of Rio de Janeiro launched a
program as part of the new public safety policies in order to improve security in the city
of Rio de Janeiro. Although named ‘pacification program’, the operation consisted of
the militarization of the most violent favelas in Rio. In order to achieve legitimacy for
the military intervention and avoid public rejection, the incursions of the military police
in the favelas were strongly supported by the media-led metaphor of ‘war’. The
construction of a narrative of war was needed in order to justify the invasion and
permanent territorial occupation and control about to be done by the military forces. In
the case of Rio’s pacification program, law played a central role in creating a
framework in order to talk about the ‘justice’ and efficacy of wartime violence.265
As posed by Roberto Malighelli, the pacified/militarized communities becomes
similar to the notion of ‘the camp’ proposed by Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben,
as ‘within this type of space, delimited by territorial and symbolic enclosures, the legal
order includes and controls what it excludes, through its own exceptional
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suspension’.266 The state of exception during a military operation in a favela acquires a
biopolitical, even a necropolitical meaning, representing a structure in which the law
includes the living through its own interruption.267 Favelas, in being permanently
occupied by the state’s authority, are turned into the idea of ‘camp’, constituting a space
of permanent exception.

v.

The colonial myth of the pacification project

The program implemented by the state of Rio de Janeiro named Unidade de
Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) – Police Pacification Units – is considered to be the largest
security operation in Brazilian history.268 As an example of its dimension, on 28th
November 2010, ‘a combined force of two thousand seven hundred soldiers, and civil
and military police, aided by air force attack helicopters, navy marines, armored cars,
tanks, high-velocity weapons, and elite special forces’ launched a military invasion on
Complexo do Alemão, a group of favelas in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro.269 The
media covered the invasion, providing news in real time.
Created in 2008, the pacification program was a replacement for the
unsuccessful short-term LOG operations. It proposed to combine proximity policing
with infrastructural, social, and economic projects in order to bridge the existing gaps
between segregated territories within Rio de Janeiro.270 The program was intended to
consist of three phases: a military invasion of the violent community, followed by
several months of heavy patrol forces, and finally the training of its residents to assist
the recruited military police in long-term social projects.271
The first UPP was installed in Santa Marta, south zone of Rio de Janeiro, in
2008, three years earlier than the Decree that officially created the program was
published. Eventually, the program, which was originally linked to the Secretary of
Human Rights of Rio de Janeiro, had its own decree with norms and budget.272
Although there is a regulation requiring that police officers have some kind of training
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in human rights, there are no defined rules for the procedures of the officers of the
pacification units.273
Rio’s government wanted to occupy and pacify favelas so they could be
administered by the state in the same way as the rest of the city, that is so that favela
residents could become full citizens while stressing that policing paves the way for
investment in infrastructure and the establishment of social programs to solve the
community’s issues.274 Most of the UPP was planned to be established at the top of the
favelas’ hills in a strategic location so the police could observe the movement and
symbolically take the place of gangs who used the same strategic locations.275 Many
residents were cynical about the reasons behind the program, seeing it as an effort to
show foreigners Rio’s ability to deal with violence on the eve of major sports events;
they wonder if the program would survive the next elections or past the 2016
Olympics.276
The policy of pacification implemented in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro is
essential to a set of neoliberal accumulation strategies, as explained in the First Chapter.
The favelas are retaken based on military operations that invade and dominate them
through armed power. Once the mission is completed, the Brazilian and the Military
Police’s flag is raised by tactical teams to celebrate the regaining of the territory. After
the first phase, the control over the territory continues, and the permanent presence of
military police officers becomes disproportionately higher than in other areas of the
city.277 In some areas, houses are marked with blue paint and later demolished, on the
basis of ‘irregular housing’, and are then given to companies that have a public-private
partnership with Rio’s government.278
According to Rio’s government, the project was designed to help the state regain
control over territories long lost to drug trafficking, as well as to reintegrate these
economically challenging communities into society,279 in a sort of transformative
occupation. However, the program can also be described as the transformation of the
public and sociopolitical tutelage of these communities into forced militarized tutelage,
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aiming at the promotion of ‘new markets’, reduction of economic risks, and creation of
profit opportunities. Several companies saw new business opportunities in the occupied
favelas, not only those who have a partnership with Rio’s government but others that
aim to install factories and industries. The program received direct donations from
several private companies, such as Coca-Cola, Souza Cruz, and even banks, and on the
program’s website, it was listed other institutions, such as International Lions Club and
the U.S Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro.280
As Wikileaks revealed, in 2009 the Embassy of the United States sent a telegram
to the government of Rio de Janeiro praising the UPPs, by saying
In addition to the obvious security factors involved in the pacification program,
there are also significant economic interests at stake, with many analysts
estimating that Rio de Janeiro's economy could grow by 38 billion reais if
favelas are reincorporated into traditional society and markets. The peace
program shares many characteristics with US counterinsurgency doctrine and
strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. The program's success will ultimately depend
not only on effective and sustained coordination by the police and state and
municipal governments but also on favela residents' perception of the state's
legitimacy.281
The term ‘pacification’ originated in times of colonial warfare, and it has only
more recently been reappropriated as a theoretical concept. Some scholars dedicated to
developing a critical pacification theory draw attention to both the destructive and the
productive qualities of ‘pacification’, while modern liberal democracies only address
the productive qualities of the theory.282 The pacification of a population, in accordance
with settler-colonial practices and colonial warfare, encompasses the promotion of the
acceptance of the native population to the new state of affairs. For Neocleous, security
entrepreneurs play a role in the fabrication of capitalist relations through a ‘war for
accumulation’

that

‘involves

the

production

of

conditions

for

capitalist

accumulation’.283 At the favelas, there was the need to create docile bodies that could
become a disciplined and cheap workforce to the companies that would economically
explore the locations. As an example, Procter & Gamble was installed at Cidade de
Deus a year after it was occupied by the military police forces being granted tax
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incentives by Rio’s government, and Philips consulted with Rio’s secretary of public
security about the UPP installations at Morro do Dendê, as it had interests in opening a
factory in the region.284
Other businesses that already existed in the communities were taken over by the
pacification units. For instance, although illegal, the alternative transportation provided
by motorcycles, which had social value because it is the only transport modality capable
of accessing narrow steep alleys of the favela, was taken over by police units and
managed it as their own business.285 This decision implies that the favela is an inferior
space that deserves their compassion, but also a space to personally benefit from.
The biggest intention of the pacification program is to produce a disciplined
workforce, able to work but not to accumulate from it, which is faced by the resistance
of the residents themselves. UPP’s are often seen by residents – especially the young,
dark-skinned men – as aggressive forces of occupation.286 Although there is the
question of temporality, it is uncertain for how long the units will stay in the
communities. A favela resident, when asked how quickly the drug traffic would return if
the UPP was withdrawn from their community, answered that ‘they would meet each
other on the way out’.287
The pacification program was developed as a strategy that maintains a direct link
with a project of city and power. Such as the pacification of natives as explained by
Neocleous in the first chapter, Rio’s program is aimed as a tool to build a new social
order in certain favelas, with a huge impact on the inhabitants’ lives. The police started
to define what culture and leisure are, by determining the organization of local events,
including vexatious searches in residents, and implementing curfew in some areas.
Resolution 013/2007 of the State Government of Rio de Janeiro determine that the wellknown ‘baile funks’288 would have to be authorized by the police forces, which, from
the residents’ point of view, is an emblematic example of how the local government
tries to erase favela culture and controls residents’ socio-spatial right to public space
and local traditions.289
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The Resolution confirms that Rio’s government recognized the importance of
funk as a cultural manifestation of favelas and believed that it was vital to tame the
informality and the disorder of these manifestations that could ‘lead to criminality’, a
logic that resembles the broken windows theory.290 This is another element that
demonstrates the colonial underlying logic of the control of police over Rio’s favelas,
based on a false superiority of the conqueror’s lifestyle, and the attempt to enforce these
parameters in favelas.291
With the presence of the state embodied in their agents, the inhabitants of
favelas under military occupation are subjectified and corporeally disciplined, as in any
other ‘normal urban agglomeration’. Yet, after pacification, the double-panopticism
turns into a claustrophobic space, since both police and drug traffickers are permanently
present within the community. Residents, therefore, must deal with the fact that both
may be watching at the same time, and in order to navigate such a context, they must be
simultaneously aware of the presence and behavior of police and traffickers in order to
know what they can and can’t do at different times and places.292

290

Pier Angelli de Luca Maciel. The Pacification of Favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Supra note 278. At 90.
Id.
292
Matthew Aaron Richmond. “Hostages to both sides”. Supra note 216. At 78.
291

57

IV. CONCLUSION
The seeming contradiction between Israel’s claim to be a liberal democracy and
its status as a settler-colonial state with an ongoing project of expropriation of
Palestinian resolves when we take into consideration that Israel permanently imposes an
apparent ‘state of exception’ that Benjamin found to be the historical norm for the
oppressed.293 The techniques by which it maintains and enforces its colonial rule, far
from causing scandal to the Western democracies, are coveted and purchased by
them294, due its well-constructed legal narratives. As posed by Neocleous, the
development of the mainstream legal order originated from the colonization and
exploitation of the colonies aiming the continuous capital accumulation and the
subjugation of the Other by settler colonial policies.295
Pacification is a powerful mechanism for social control, and its tactics are found
to be utilized by western hegemonies from colonial wars until modernity when wars on
drugs and wars on terror are wielded against the so-called ‘enemies of the state’.
Applied in the politics of security, pacification occurs with construction and
reconstruction, and politics and force. According to Neocleous, security achieves
pacification through political and economic force, deconstruction and reconstruction,
and social reconstruction through the military and police force, and it is a mechanism
that has been historically used to control and oppress certain populations, aiming capital
accumulation.296 The analysis of the recent history of Rio’s favelas and the occupied
Palestinian territories demonstrates how the main strategy of governmentality shifted
from exceptional spaces to spaces where hyper legality brings its inhabitants to the
center of necropolitical policies of death, such as the manhunt institution – which is one
of the main tactics of the pacification project. This security strategy demands one of two
possible relations to the native population: their exploitation as a subordinated labor
force – as in the case of Rio’s favelas – or their more or less rapid extermination – as in
the case of the occupied Palestinian territories.297
While Gaza serves as an enclosed camp for brutal Israeli experiments of its
military and security, not only Rio, but several other States in joined solidarity with
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Israel continues to acquire their security apparatuses in order to develop its own local
settler colonial strategies. On December 2018, the Rio’s governor went to Israel in order
to buy drones to be used for security reasons. He was also clear when stated that ‘what
is happening in Israel will happen in Rio de Janeiro’, followed by several statements
about the possibility for state agents to ‘shoot to kill’298. What he addressed was the
existence of an authoritarian effort to construct a new legal approach that will give the
possibility of state agents to ‘shoot first, and ask later’, similar to the targeted killing
policy already been used by Israel – the ultimate expression of the manhunt institution.
The discourse of ‘state of security’ concerning Brazilian favelas is transforming through
legal narratives in order to give state agents a ‘license to kill’ in hot pursuits.
Recently, a project of federal law was presented to the Brazilian National
Congress in which military and security agents may be exempt from punishment when
committing murder (and other criminal acts) justified in order to keep the ‘law and
order’, a legal exemption beyond self-defense and that can be used mainly to justify
targeted killing in the favelas. Although the law was not approved, the project
represents the ultimate instance of how the sovereign’s right to kill is being wielded by
state’s authority, under the populist discourse of a ‘war on drugs’ justified due to its
exceptionality, which is, in reality, included in a space of hyper legality.
In July 2018, the Knesset approved the Jewish Nation-State Law that declared
Israel to be the ‘nation-state of the Jewish people,’ and that the ‘right of selfdetermination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people.’299 The Law is an
‘Israeli Basic Law’, in other words, a constitutional law, that claims Palestinian people
are unable to claim liberation on, or a right to, the land that constitutes the State of
Israel.300 The law emphasizes the importance of collective identity, although only of the
Jewish people, and fails to offer any basis for attachment of non-Jewish citizens to the
state of Israel, utterly ignoring their existence.301 It was the last (so far) nail in the coffin
that ultimately furthered Palestinians away from self-determination and advanced the
Israeli settler-colonial strategy.
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